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1. Introduction 
 
a) Research questions 
 
Industrial relations in Europe are changing. Different developments in the industrial 
realm – which are either present in industrialized countries worldwide, are regional in 
nature or concern merely national particularities – together lead to pressures that 
render political action necessary and ultimately lead to the transformation of systems 
of industrial relations. While such political action typically occurs within a certain 
nation state, as in many cases core areas of statehood are implicated, within the 
European Union we can find an additional political sphere that transcends nation 
state borders. This sphere is able to take measures, which may directly or indirectly 
affect member states’ policies. Action by the European Union1 therefore must be 
considered when researching the transformation process of systems of industrial 
relations in Europe.  
 
As there are numerous falsehoods regarding such influence on national systems, it is 
even more necessary that political research differentiates between factors that play a 
role in transforming national systems and those that do not.  Leibfried and Pierson – 
in their ground-breaking book about European social policy (Leibfried and Pierson 
1995a) – have identified several factors that influence social policymaking in the 
member states. They argued:  
 
“Within Europe, a wide range of policies classically considered domestic cannot 
now be comprehended without acknowledging the role of the European Union 
within an increasingly integrated but still fragmented polity.” (Pierson and 
Leibfried 1995: 1-2) 
 
                                            
1 Although – before the Treaty of Lisbon came into force - there were important (legal) differences between the 
European Community and the European Union, in this piece of work the term European Union refers to both alike. 
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This leads Leibfried and Pierson to the conclusion that social policy in modern 
Europe operates in a multi-tiered system, where different levels – though not 
necessarily directly – interact and, taken together, form what may be called European 
social policy. The definition of social policy by Pierson and Leibfried is broad, 
comprising all policies that “modify market outcomes to facilitate transactions, to 
correct market failures, and to carry out regional, interclass, or intergenerational 
redistribution” (Leibfried and Pierson 1995b: 43).  
 
One possibility, among others, to achieve market modification and redistribution  is 
found in industrial relations. A multitude of definitions of industrial relations currently 
exists, and they vary to some extent: while some take account of human resource 
management (Bamber, Lansbury et al. 2008), others do not (Visser 1996c; Hyman 
2001). But all definitions agree that industrial relations are somehow “about the 
regulation or governance of the employment relationship” (Marginson and Sisson 
2002: 671) and ultimately about the regulation of the labour market. Pierson and 
Leibfried’s definition would place them under the category of social policy.  
 
Another link between industrial relations and social policy is given by Brandl and 
Traxler who note that “industrial relations and social policy have evolved as separate, 
institutionally differentiated policy fields” (Brandl and Traxler 2005: 635). Because 
both share the same purposes, interdependencies and externalities must arise 
especially due – on one hand – to collective bargaining and collective wage 
agreements and – on the other – to social protection policies, also referred to as 
welfare policies. Crouch (1999), pointing to the British example, denies an automatic 
connection between industrial relations and welfare, but nevertheless defines social 
policy as a combination of the two concepts. What becomes clear, indeed, is that 
industrial relations are a key component of social policy. In an analysis of social 
policy, we therefore must also account for the specific actors, traditions, and power 
relations in the field of industrial relations. Overall, we can say that European social 
policy is not only a multi-tiered system of governments, but in fact is a multi-tiered 
system of governments, business and labour – the three chief actors of industrial 
relations (Visser 1996c: 7-11).  
 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the influence of the European Union in relation to 
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the pressure it places on the national systems of industrial relations.  The influence of 
the European Union in the transformation of national systems of industrial relations, 
defined as all interactions of government, business and labour aimed at regulating 
the employment relationship – including welfare policies resulting from business-
labour cooperation – may at first seem puzzling. It might be true that the European 
Union has a social deficit, defined as a misbalance in the consideration of 
economical and social interests (Streeck 1995; Scharpf 2002; Joerges and Rödl 
2009). It is also true that competences in the field of social policy remain largely in 
the domain of member states (Leibfried et al. 1995b). This is not surprising given the 
historical goals of social policy, which have been nation-building and the creation of 
national identity (Davies 2006). What all authors agree upon, however, is that a 
considerable degree of influence from the European level nevertheless exists. If this 
influence exists in the general realm of social policy, it should exist in industrial 
relations as well, as such relations are a component of social policy.  
 
Following one of the basic distinctions of industrial relations - those between labour, 
business, and government (Dunlop 1993) - it seems sufficient to focus on one of the 
three groups in order to limit the extent of the workload while nevertheless allowing 
for meaningful conclusions. Considering the previously mentioned importance of 
social policy in regard to national identity, the ongoing discussions of the European 
Union’s social deficit, and its implications for legitimacy of European policymaking, 
labour seems a suitable choice for further analysis. Furthermore, various 
(economical) pressures on labour market policy increase the difficulties that 
organized labour faces, illustrated by recent discussions on the right to strike in the 
context of European law. Nevertheless, some of the discussions in certain parts of 
this thesis will be relevant to the other actors as well, and aspects concerning other 
actors will be necessary for analyzing trade unions’ circumstances. In this case only 
will the situation of business and the state be considered. The research question of 
this master thesis therefore is: How can European integration affect the possibilities 
of national trade unions? 
 
Analyzing the effects of European integration on trade unions can be complex, as 
this question is connected to at least three wider considerations (Marginson and 
Sisson 2004). First, the discussion of convergence or divergence, an age-old theme 
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dominant in research of industrial relations, underpins the importance of intra-state 
factors. Two scenarios are possible: European integration can lead to increased 
convergence of systems of industrial relations in Europe (or even a new single 
European level system of industrial relations); or national systems prove to be 
persistent, maintaining diversity as the main phenomenon in Europe. Convergence is 
usually explained by either business approaches, focussing on best-practice, or 
sociological approaches, focussing on isomorphism (Risse, Green Cowles et al. 
2001: 15-18; Marginson et al. 2004: 76-78). Hay (2000; cited in Marginson et al. 
2004) distinguishes between four types of convergence: input convergence, policy 
convergence, output convergence, and process convergence. This differentiation has 
proven useful, as research on the convergence-divergence theme in most cases has 
shown ambiguous results: convergence of industrial relations at one point and 
persistent divergence in another (Ferner and Hyman 1992; Ferner and Hyman 1998; 
Traxler et al. 2001; Marginson et al. 2002).  
 
The second difficulty lies in discovering where the pressures leading to change 
originate. Are these global or European phenomena? Even if questions of the policy 
dimension are set aside, it is unclear where pressures set forth above find their 
source. It could be that developments at the European level that influence national 
systems are merely the regional version of global phenomena; alternatively, it may 
be that global trends are weak but are increased at the European level. However, it is 
not easy to separate global from European developments. It would, in fact, make little 
sense to do so.  
 
If we wish to assess the role of the European level in altering industrial relations, it is 
sufficient in the present context if the European level plays some role, either as a 
mediator or a source. The participation of European level institutions is therefore a 
decisive element if we want to assess specific European developments, as only then 
is it possible to directly trace these back to the European level. 
 
The third difficulty is the extent of choice available to actors of industrial relations. 
This brings back in the ‘rules of the game’, as these set the borders for – in our case 
– trade union action, and are heavily affected by changes resulting from various 
pressures. Questions concerning procedural rules are consistently questions about 
 9
institutions of industrial relations, as such relations have their own set of rules, 
traditions, etc. It does not mean, however, that if no institutions exist, or if they differ 
largely, that there are no rules or common characteristics. In fact, institutions of 
industrial relations create an additional layer of rules that exists in addition to the 
general rules guiding society.  
 
b) Theoretical background 
 
In order to understand the effects of European integration on national trade unions, 
the concept of Europeanization (Wincott 2003; Radaelli 2004) may be used as an 
aid: Integration in the field of social policy and, accordingly in industrial relations, is a 
reality that has evolved over several years. The results of the integration process 
touch upon national industrial relations as well as trade unions and lead to certain 
transformation pressures. Those pressures, in other words, are consequences of 
former integration steps. However, Europeanization is not an automatic process, as 
mediating factors must be considered. Still, the concept of Europeanization helps us 
to understand the pressures that national systems confront.  
 
Pressures on national trade unions might be a result of European integration, but do 
not have to be Europeanization already. Europeanization has several different 
meanings (Olsen 2002): First, Europeanization can mean the penetration of systems 
of governance, i.e. the transformation of national systems towards a European role 
model. This would be the case for example with changes in the mode of consultation 
of trade unions by national governments as they align their decision-making 
procedures to fulfil standards defined at the European level (Schroeder 2009). 
Second, Europeanization can mean the creation of supra-national institutions, ending 
up in a fully-fledged European level system. This is integration in the classical sense. 
Third, Europeanization may refer to the geographical dimension, i.e. enlargement of 
the Union. Fourth, it may describe processes of transfer of political organization 
and/or governance, meaning imitations of those in non-European countries. Fifth, it 
may simply be used as synonym for the whole European ‘unification’ process, 
consisting of all four previous dimensions. 
 
Not all of those five types of Europeanization set out above are useful in the present 
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context, as already Olsen himself (2002: 924) points to the problem that 
Europeanization does not automatically lead to more European integration, as 
Europeanization does not have to be regarded as positive or as desirable goal by 
domestic actors. Europeanization therefore has to be analyzed distinctly from 
integration, as it does not tell us enough about the conditions for future integration. 
Europeanization understood in the sense of the first meaning described by Olsen 
may nevertheless help us to achieve a better understanding of the integration 
process, as the transformation of national systems on the one side and integration on 
the other side may be linked insofar, as the pressures potentially leading to domestic 
transformation might under certain conditions as well encourage integration. This 
needs further explanation: integration theory aims at describing why and under which 
conditions power is transferred from regional entities to a new centre or – with the 
more sophisticated words of one of the most famous integration theorists, Ernst B. 
Haas (1958; cited in Diez and Wiener 2005: 2) – integration theory is defined as the 
process “whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded 
to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose 
institutions process or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states”. 
Regarding European integration, there are two basic theoretical streams: 
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. 
 
Neofunctionalism 
Neofunctionalism goes back to Ernst B. Haas’ book ‘The Uniting of Europe’ (1958), 
where he analyzed the emergence of the European Coal and Steel Community. 
Although Haas in the aftermath actually abandoned neofunctionalism, other authors 
have picked up his ideas. In very abbreviated form, neofunctionalism says the 
following: due to large exogenous pressures the problem-solving capacities of 
national governments are unsatisfactory. Usually those pressures have a 
transnational element, i.e. the problem is shared by several nations, as otherwise 
governments in their search for alternatives would not turn to the idea of integration. 
The problem in the beginning might be very limited in scope, just affecting for 
instance a single policy area. In this area, nations arrive at the opinion that tackling 
this problem at an international level with the creation of institutions would be a 
successful solution. The creation of these institutions follows what Schmitter (2005: 
58) calls the “hypothesis of natural entropy”: as these institutions reflect the lowest 
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common denominator, nations are interested in securing this agreement and 
therefore attach these institutions with a self-maintaining set of rules that secures the 
status quo. This status quo is disrupted by so-called spill-over effects: ongoing 
exogenous pressures, contradictions within the created system including unexpected 
results generated for instance by the institutions themselves in pursuing the defined 
goals and frustrations with the actual outcomes all lead to the search for alternative 
solutions. According to neofunctionalists, nations are likely to look for solutions within 
the existing supranational institutions, revising their scope, level or area. This is also 
described by the differentiation between functional, political, and geographical spill-
over (Falkner 1998: 8-9, summarising earlier writings):  
 
 Functional spill-over refers to the effects of interdependencies between policy-
areas: measures taken in the one area have a direct effect in another 
neighbouring area, which create the pressures that are the precondition for 
integration also in this field.   
 Political spill-over refers to the shift of loyalties and expectations as well as to 
the extent of competencies of the supranational institutions: in order to solve the 
still existing problems, the level of commitment is increased. In other words: 
more competences are transferred to the supranational institutions.  
 Geographical spill-over means the enlargement of the integrated area, i.e. the 
accession of new nations.  
 
This whole process is not anymore seen as an automatic one: political will is a 
decisive element in further integration steps and institutions that are too limited in 
scope and level probably will never even have the possibility to start the process, as 
they have no implications at the national level - Schmitter calls this the “hypothesis of 
increasing mutual determination” (2005: 59). 
 
If we now turn to the focus of this paper, the potential role of labour within 
neofunctionalism is easy to find: non-state actors play a major role within it, as they 
are not bound to the nation state but directly interact with the supranational 
institutions and their government at the same time. If their governments are unwilling 
or unable to fulfil the demands of non-state actors, they are free to turn to the 
supranational institutions and use them to pursue their goals. Thereby, they promote 
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integration, as – if this strategy proves successful – more and more non-state actors 
turn to the supranational institutions and in the long term shift their loyalties and 
expectations towards them (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2005: 36). Due to the 
primarily economic character of European integration, this has been especially true 
for business actors. But as the European Union spreads into other areas as well – 
like social policy – the same might happen with actors of labour, especially trade 
unions. 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism 
Liberal intergovernmentalism treats the European Union as a typical international 
organization dominated by nation states. Originating in theory of international 
relations, liberal intergovernmentalism was mainly developed by Andrew Moravcsik 
(e.g.1993) and postulates that the European Union can be analyzed as any other 
international organization. Liberal intergovernmentalism consists of two elements 
(Falkner 1998: 14): on the one side, nations are the main actors at the international 
level. International politics therefore are made out of intergovernmental bargaining, in 
which nations act rational. This means that they constantly calculate benefits and 
costs of their actions and try to maximize their own advantages as much as possible 
in the respective circumstances. European integration accordingly is limited to the 
boundaries set by the member states, i.e. the boundaries of integration lie where 
their costs outweigh their benefits.  
National preferences in liberal intergovernmentalism are defined by domestic interest 
groups and do not change during the negotiation process. Therefore national 
preferences may vary from issue to issue, as domestic power constellations and 
accordingly majorities may vary. Nevertheless, nation states at the international level 
are unitary actors, as the respective governments alone represent the aggregated 
national interests. There is no independent role at the international level for non-state 
actors.  
 
But what happens after integration? For sure not necessarily more integration. 
Coming back to the concept of Europeanization outlined above, we can see that 
Europeanization not automatically leads to integration and must not even be the 
direct result of measures taken at the European level, but might as well be a parallel 
development in various member states as – due to their membership - they share 
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certain characteristics, which build the frame for these developments. The ideal-
typical modes of influence of the European level on the domestic level (top-down) 
identified in the literature on Europeanization are the regulatory misfit approach, the 
opportunity structure approach, and the cognitive approach (Börzel and Risse 2003b: 
490-492; Knill 2005: 157-166).   
 
 Regulatory misfit describes the following: standards set at the European Union 
level have to be implemented in the member states. These European rules will 
be more or less compatible with the existing national arrangements. The higher 
the misfit between those is, the higher will accordingly the adaptation pressures 
be. One might now expect that higher pressures are more likely to lead to 
institutional change in the member states and therefore to Europeanization, but 
referring to new institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996) the proponents of the 
misfit approach argue that due to path-dependencies change just happens 
along those lines (or paths) already present in the national system. Therefore 
moderate adaptation pressures are the most likely to invoke institutional 
change. Low pressures are too weak to create the necessary incentives for 
change, while high pressures conflict that much with the existing arrangements 
that adaptation would be too costly and face too much resistance respectively. 
But even moderate pressures are not automatically generating change, as 
mediating factors have to be taken into account (Risse et al. 2001: 9-12; Börzel 
and Risse 2003a). 
 
 The opportunity structure approach (Börzel et al. 2003b: 492-493; Knill 2005: 
161-163) looks at the transformation of power and resource distribution 
between various national actors which results from new European level 
opportunities to these actors. Such transformations of opportunity structures are 
the more likely, the more contested the national institutional concept is, as 
support from the European level in this case might make the difference. The 
probability of transformation therefore is low where one actor has a dominant 
position, while in situations of balance the probability is high. But even if 
transformation occurs, it is unclear if this leads to Europeanization, as the 
direction of the transformation is unclear. It then depends on whether those 
actors, which support European solutions, gain from the transformations, or if it 
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is the other way round. 
 
 The cognitive approach focuses on the changes in norms and values of national 
actors, which are induced by European level activity. Such activity sets a frame 
of cognitive values and norms. When national actors engage in processes 
where European level activity plays a role, those actors will try to reconcile their 
own values and norms with those set out in the European frame and by doing 
so will contribute to the transformation process.  (Börzel et al. 2003b: 493-494; 
Knill 2005: 163-166). 
 
All of these three approaches describe how Europeanization may work. But 
Europeanization is located at the national level, leading in best case to convergence 
towards a European model, and is a top-down process, in which European measures 
transform the domestic systems of the member states. But Europeanization – as 
Börzel (2002: 193) notes correctly – is a two way process, as well including a bottom-
up dimension which also might be called European integration. It has already been 
mentioned that the top-down and the bottom-up dimension taken together do not 
form an automatic cycle of ongoing integration.  
 
Nevertheless, using the two theories of European integration outlined above, we can 
form hypotheses how top-down pressures potentially leading to Europeanization 
might as well lead to integration. 
 
In the case of liberal intergovernmentalism, there is not much room for the top-down 
side of Europeanization. Domestic changes may lead to different national 
preferences, but these changes are not the result of Europeanization, but of “the 
economic incentives generated by patterns of international economic 
interdependence” (Moravcsik 1998: 6; cited in Risse et al. 2001: 14). Variation 
therefore is mainly dependent upon exogenous factors and not on endogenous 
transformation. Nevertheless, Moravcsik allows for some role of ideological or 
geopolitical preferences, but subordinate to economic preferences.  
If liberal intergovernmentalism holds true, there is only a limited role for 
Europeanization. Two effects of previous integration are possible: on the one side, 
integrating new issue areas might lead to the involvement of new national interest 
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groups and therefore to a change in the domestic power structure which decides the 
national preferences (Rittberger et al. 2005: 28). As long as also these new domestic 
majorities may gain from integration, the integration process in this issue area will 
continue.  
On the other side, Moravcsik himself (1993: 515; cited in Rosamond 2000: 138) 
describes how national governments are strengthened vis-à-vis their domestic 
politics: “National leaders undermine potential opposition by reaching bargains in 
Brussels first and presenting domestic groups with an ‘up or down’ choice (…)”. 
Additional information sources and agenda-setting power strengthen national 
governments as well. As in such a case governments gain from integration, they are 
more willing to accept it, although they have to transfer sovereignty. They are 
exchanging autonomy at the international level against improved domestic 
circumstances. In both cases it is important to note that the domestic consequences 
of European integration according to liberal intergovernmentalism are fully intended 
by the nations and the domestic majorities creating their preferences. This at the 
same time is one of the major differences of intergovernmentalism with 
neofunctionalism. 
Both of these possible integrationist effects are to some extent similar to the 
opportunity structure approach outlined above, as they all are about domestic power 
structures. Nevertheless, liberal intergovernmentalism has severe problems in 
accounting for Europeanization, as it becomes just possible under very narrow 
conditions and even then the problem still exists that domestic politics have been 
defined as rather insulated domain by Moravcsik. 
 
Linking Europeanization and neofunctionalism does not face the problem of 
encapsulated domestic politics, as interdependence across borders and sectors is a 
key element of this theoretical stream. This openness towards the European level 
basically allows for the functioning of all three Europeanization procedures outlined 
above, as neofunctionalism with regard to change of opportunity structures and to the 
cognitive approach expects a shift of expectations and loyalties towards the 
European level. In this sense, cognitive change caused by being engaged with 
another polity level and cognitive change due to ideational and normative attitudes is 
the same. In other words: Neofunctionalism takes both the opportunity structure and 
the cognitive approach as cases of political spillover. The regulatory misfit approach 
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in contrast does not create this shift of loyalties and expectations, but it might get 
relevant in another context: if misfit occurs and domestic change is not a preferred 
option to the relevant national actors as a result of path-dependencies, functional 
pressures might increase – either due to integration in another area or due to non-
action – and ultimately lead to spill-over.  
 
All of this is quite hypothetical and based on several assumptions, which have not yet 
been empirically proven. This is also why authors writing about Europeanization 
regularly point to so-called mediating factors that influence the degree of 
Europeanization (Risse et al. 2001: 9-12; Caporaso 2007: 30-33). Those mediating 
factors can be manifold. “Indeed, nearly every domestic structural condition that 
affects the impact of European integration could be conceptualized as mediating 
factor” (Caporaso 2007: 30). In research design, it is therefore necessary to be very 
clear on these mediating factors. 
 
c) Methodology 
 
The operationalization of the research question faces several problems, some of 
which already have been discussed. But how can these be solved? The effects of 
European integration on national trade unions, as illustrated above, are a question of 
a top-down relationship between the European and the domestic level, where we can 
employ the concept of Europeanization. In this concept, a certain extent of integration 
already is taken as given (for a description of the precise extent of integration in the 
field of social policy, see the next chapter). Empirical research designs use the 
existing European level system as an independent variable explaining the changes at 
the domestic level, themselves being the dependent variable. The mediating factors 
described above serve as intervening variables. Taken together, this is the standard 
top-down model of Europeanization (Caporaso 2007) in contrast to the bottom-up 
model described by Radaelli and Pasquier (2007), which concentrates on domestic 
politics. The problem of the standard approach is twofold: first, it focuses on the 
regulatory misfit approach. Héritier and Knill (2001) have shown to the contrary, that 
misfit is not a necessary precondition for domestic change (c.f. the two other 
approaches of Europeanization outlined above). Second, this model aims at 
describing domestic change, while in the present context we are interested in the 
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pressures resulting from European integration, not in change as a factual 
development. This has to be considered in the methodology and leads to the 
following design: European integration in the field of social policy is taken as given 
and does not vary between individual member states. Due to the level of integration 
that already has been achieved, the action capacities of national trade unions get 
under pressure, as national systems either show regulatory misfit compared to 
European models, national opportunity-structures are influenced and/or cognitive 
realignments occur.  
The pressures on national trade unions, not changes in their actual possibilities, are 
the phenomena to be approached. Not domestic change is researched, but only the 
preconditions for change. Finally, those pressures are stronger or weaker depending 
on mediating factors formed by the national systems of industrial relations.  
 
Graph 1: Research Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now we turn to the relevant factors in more detail: first, the status quo of European 
integration needs to be assessed more precisely, as referring to European integration 
as a whole only delivers a blurred picture. Therefore we have to detect the possible 
ways of influence through which the European level may exert pressure on the 
domestic structures. The more powerful these ways of influence are, the higher 
hypothetically the pressures. As we have ruled out the horizontal dimension of 
Europeanization, i.e. mutual influences between the member states, in order to avoid 
that adaptation pressures stemming from the European level are mixed with global, 
purely domestic or regional (in the sense of not covering all member states) 
pressures respectively, we can focus on top-down regulatory instruments of the 
European level in the field of social policy, which in their respective form can be 
European 
Integration 
Mediating 
Factors 
Pressures on 
Domestic Systems 
Change in 
Domestic Systems 
(...) Renewed 
Integration 
Present Research Design 
+ =
 18
aligned on a continuum between hard and soft according to their degree of precision, 
delegation, and obligation (Abbott and Snidal 2000; for a critique of this approach see 
Barani 2006). Of course, the content of every single act would have to be analyzed in 
detail in order to align it on the hard-soft continuum. On a more abstract level, those 
instruments nevertheless may be divided in four distinct categories according to their 
procedural characteristics:  
 
 First, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), a procedure that combines 
„broad participation in policy-making, co-ordination of multiple levels of 
government, use of information and benchmarking, recognition of the need for 
diversity, and structured but unsanctioned guidance from the Commission and 
Council“ (Mosher and Trubek 2003: 64), is the most soft, as it is non-binding, 
not delegating any interpreting powers (for instance to courts), and with low 
precision as goals are frequently only broadly defined (Heidenreich and 
Bischoff 2008: 500-504).  
 
 Second, the procedure of Articles 138/139 of the EC-Treaty, also called social 
dialogue procedure (Falkner 1998: 187-190). This procedure allows for 
independent European level bargaining between labour and business and 
may result in the adoption of binding acts by the Council which have been 
negotiated by the social partners (Welz 2008). It is not easy to assign the 
social dialogue procedure a stable place on the hard-soft continuum, as its 
outcomes might differ largely – from binding and precise agreements adopted 
by the Council to non-binding declarations of intent. Nevertheless, the mere 
possibility for business and labour of choosing the actual mode of regulation 
and implementation themselves justifies the existence of this category and its 
alignment between soft and hard law. 
 
 Third, there is the classical Community method with involvement of the 
European Commission as agenda-setter, as well as the Council and the 
European Parliament as legislators. Although regulations are to be placed 
nearer to the hard pole of the continuum than directives, both do not differ in 
the law-making procedure.  
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 Finally, decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are arguably the 
hardest form, as they are both binding and precise. It might be contested that 
ECJ decisions deserve an own category, as they should give interpretations of 
other regulative instruments, especially those decided under the Community 
method. But several authors have shown how the ECJ has used the existing 
interpretational leeway to engage in judicial activism (e.g.Weiler 1991; Burley 
and Mattli 1993; Alter 2000; Stone Sweet 2005). 
 
Now we can turn to the mediating factors, which might also influence the effects of 
European integration on the national systems of industrial relations, but do stem from 
the national rather than the European level. In case of our research question those 
are national systems of industrial relations. Of course, every single member state of 
the European Union has its own national system of industrial relations, including its 
own history, traditions, institutions, actors, and so on. Therefore it would be in fact 
necessary to analyze the pressures of European integration on trade union 
possibilities in 27 different national systems in order to make exact predictions for 
those systems each. But this would be - on one hand - impossible due to space, and 
- on the other - the scientific insights possibly achieved from this approach would be 
limited, as it is the goal of every comparative research to “maximise experimental 
variance, minimize error variance, and control extraneous variance” (Peters 1998: 
30), and not to compare everything to everything else.  
 
In order to fulfil the requirements set out by Peters, research design is crucial. Two 
basic research designs, that first have been described by John Stuart Mill and have 
been sophisticated by others (Barrios 2006: 40-42), exist: most similar versus most 
dissimilar design. While most similar designs “compare two or more cases that are as 
different as possible in terms of the independent variable(s) and as similar as 
possible on all the spurious and intervening variables” (Burnham, Gilland et al. 2004: 
63), with most dissimilar designs it is the other way round.  
 
Although in the present context potential effects are discussed and no values are 
assigned to variables, one should not be ignorant of potential future empirical 
research. Therefore it should be asked how it is possible to avoid too big a gap 
between the present deliberations and potential future research. Such future 
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empirical research would first have to establish from appropriate data whether there 
is a causal link between European integration and effects on national systems of 
industrial relations. In the present non-empirical context, it therefore seems 
appropriate to discuss if European integration could make a difference and if yes, 
under which circumstances. Such a discussion might provide some useful guidelines 
to future empirical research. This would especially be the case where potential 
effects can be found despite the differences in the exact arrangements of the national 
systems of industrial relations. Finding such similar effects would solidify the 
assumption that European integration indeed is a decisive factor. 
 
But which are the differences in national systems of industrial relations in Europe? 
This question faces a serious problem: the diversity of real-life systems. This is what 
Peters called extraneous variance. He stated that “there are an almost infinite 
number of opportunities for extraneous variance to creep into the analysis” (Peters 
1998: 33). As ideal-types of industrial relations systems cannot be found in real life, it 
is as well impossible to control for all the potential factors. At this point, theory comes 
into play: various authors have studied different systems of industrial relations and 
have come up with various ideal-types focussing on isolated aspects of industrial 
relations. Before we examine those ideal-types in more detail, another advantage of 
the usage of ideal-types should be mentioned: transferability. The ideal-types that will 
be used in the present context focus on industrial relations in Europe, but as for 
ideal-types there is the possibility to test them as well in non-European 
circumstances, a crucial point given potential future research (King, Keohane et al. 
1994: 129-137).  
 
Let us now turn to the ideal-types of national systems of industrial relations. Crouch’s 
Theory of Exchange (1993: 28-49) includes four different types of which one, the 
authoritarian model, is not existent anymore, as it disappeared together with the 
fascist European systems. The other three models are: the contestational, the 
pluralist, and the corporatist model. These three models differ insofar, as due to the 
different structural characteristics of each system the costs and gains that may be 
imposed on one of the actors (business or labour) by the other actor vary and 
therefore the incentives to cooperate vary as well.  
The structural characteristics are as follows: in the contestational model, business 
 21
and labour are “alienated, their relationship is unformed, interaction is likely to be thin 
on the ground and to take the form of conflict” (Crouch 1993: 31). Intervention by the 
state regularly is necessary in order to at least fence the conflicts. Typical 
characteristics of contestational models therefore are the absence of institutionalized 
bargaining structures, weak and divided organizations on both sides of the 
employment relationship, and a high density of open conflict (van Ruysseveldt and 
Visser 1996: 27-28).   
In the pluralist model the density of interactions is higher than in contestational 
models as a result of “simple accumulation over time, or an increase in the power of 
labour (…) or of a multiplication of levels or points of interaction” (Crouch 1993: 35). 
Procedures for peacefully resolving conflicts have evolved. Nevertheless, the 
organizational structure is fragmented with no or only low central coordination and 
the state is abstinent, relying on the self-regulation of markets. In corporatist models, 
interaction is even higher and collective bargaining takes place at a centralized level 
with strong organizations of business and labour that share certain values. They are 
joined by the state which pursues its economic goals. 
 
To these three types some authors have added a fourth type called social 
partnership as special type of the corporatist model (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1997: 
338), while others have suggested typologies according to varieties of capitalism 
(Hall and Soskice 2001) and others again according to welfare state traditions 
(Esping-Andersen 1990) or state and legal traditions (Rhodes 1995). These 
approaches mostly are not typologies of industrial relations, but models explaining 
variation in national systems of industrial relations. Sticking to the idea of using ideal-
types, the typology of Crouch seems most suitable for our purposes. 
 
All in all, combining the ways of influence of European integration outlined above with 
the ideal types of industrial relations we get twelve different configurations. As 
already is obvious, we will collect the information we need to discuss each of these 
categories from the relevant literature. This becomes possible as ideal models of 
industrial relations and of ways of influence in fact hardly ever realize significant 
change. This is useful and problematic at the same time: useful as it allows for better 
modelling, problematic as it is separated from reality. Therefore the findings in the 
end have to be read with care, as empirical testing still is necessary. 
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Table 1: Overview of potential configurations 
 Soft Modes Social 
Dialogue 
Procedure 
Community 
Method 
ECJ Rulings 
Contestational 
Model 
    
Pluralist 
Model 
    
Corporatist 
Model 
    
Source: own  
 
Finally, we have to ask how we can actually identify pressures on national trade 
unions. At this point we turn back to the concept of Europeanization. To recapitulate - 
we have identified three different approaches to adaptation pressure, i.e. regulatory 
misfit, opportunity-structures, and cognition. In the first case, adaptation pressure 
would stem from the degree of fit/misfit between the European model and the 
domestic system (Caporaso 2007: 28). In the second case, a closer look is taken at 
the changes in opportunity structures, which lead to adaptation pressures. In the third 
case, it is the realignment of norms and values that is crucial. This realignment might 
change the behaviour of the involved actors and result in adaptation pressures.  
 
To sum up, pressures on national trade unions would be either stemming from 
regulatory misfit, changes in opportunity-structures or cognitive realignments. 
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Table 2: Overview of adaptational pressures 
 Soft Modes Social Dialogue 
Porcedure 
Community 
Method 
ECJ Rulings 
 M OP C M OP C M OP C M OP C 
Contesta
tional 
Model 
            
Pluralist 
Model 
            
Corporat
ist Model 
            
Source: own; M=Misfit; OP=Opportunity Structure; C=Cognitive 
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2. Past integration in the social field 
 
a) The social sphere of the European Union 
 
Already at the founding of the European Economic Community, which had been the 
predecessor of the nowadays European Union, in 1957 some aspects of social policy 
made their way into the Treaty. Although they provided only for a small base of action 
in the social field, the development thereafter was characterized by a “significant 
extent of spill-over” (Falkner 1998: 76), leading to a massive increase in European-
level activity in terms of issued directives and non-binding acts in the social field 
(Falkner, Treib et al. 2005: 53). Marginson and Sisson (2004: 84-85) identify six 
stages in the development of European social policy: the 1960s and early 1970s, the 
second half of the 1970s, the 1980s, 1990-1993, 1994-1999, and finally the time 
since 1999. Other authors come to similar classifications (Dolvik 1997: 117-122; 
Falkner 1998: 55 et seq.; Maydell et al. 2006: 22-23; Hantrais 2007: 2-15).  
 
The 1960s and early 1970s 
The initial stage of European social policy was dedicated to side-effects of the 
establishment of the European Economic Community, while it was agreed that all 
other areas except those foreseen in the Treaty should remain national competence. 
This compromise reflected two different approaches towards social policy in the early 
years: the free-market approach, which was especially promoted by Germany, 
believed that increased welfare would develop from increased economic growth 
resulting from the removal of intra-European trade barriers. The more interventionist 
approach, headed by France, feared competitive disadvantages arising from higher 
costs connected with its social system and especially its constitutional provision of 
equal pay for men and women (Falkner 2007). As a compromise, provisions on equal 
pay, paid holiday schemes, and the European Social fund found their way into the 
Treaty. Although especially the European Social Fund and the equal pay provision 
are important legal bases, market-correcting measures via the legal bases concerned 
with the common market proved more important, as under the social policy title of the 
Treaty the competences of the Commission at that time were severely restricted. 
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Social policy therefore entered the European Union through the front door of 
economic integration, instead of taking the back door of social policy. Two provisions 
of the Treaty have been significant: these are Article 100 (now Article 94 EC) and 
Article 235 (now Article 308 EC). Both of them are subsidiary clauses enabling the 
European-level institutions to act (unanimously) despite the lack of express 
competence in the Treaty, insofar as the establishment of the common market makes 
it necessary. Together with the provisions on the free movement of workers, these 
instruments built the array of European social policy action. Given this necessary link 
to the common market, regulation in the first stage was concerned with transferability 
of social security schemes, mutual recognition of qualifications, and the first 
provisions on occupational health and safety. 
 
The second half of the 1970s 
Most significantly influenced by the first Social Action Programme that has been 
adopted in 1974, the second half of the 1970s brought an increase of European 
legislation (Falkner et al. 2005: 46-47) in the fields of employment protection, 
occupational health and safety, and equal treatment. The requirement of unanimity 
voting in the Council, a situation described as joint-decision trap by Scharpf (1988), 
was achieved through a mixture of exogenous and endogenous pressures (Dolvik 
1997: 118): on the one hand, high growth rates as well as industrial restructuring and 
social exclusion in the early 1970s and the following crash of the oil crisis had 
increased awareness on the importance of social policy. Additionally, enlargement 
made the European Union grow and shifts in national governments (the end of De 
Gaulle in France and the revival of Social Democracy under Willy Brandt in 
Germany) occurred. This rendered action of the European level via Articles 100 and 
235 of the Treaty possible. The legal bases for social policy remained unchanged, as 
did the link to the common market. At the same time, taking a closer look at the 
substance of the new rules reveals lowest common denominator policies, where “the 
interests of the member state are necessarily safeguarded” (Pierson et al. 1995: 8). 
 
The 1980s 
The development of European social policy in the 1980s is closely linked to the 
person of Jacques Delors, who was French minister of finance and economics from 
1981 to 1984 and who became the President of the European Commission in 1985. 
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Already during the French Council presidency in 1984, the idea of creating a 
‘European Social Space’ brought social policy back into the discussion. But it was not 
until the Single European Act for the first time extensively amended the Treaties in 
1987 that a new dynamic came into social policy. Although the innovations in the field 
of social policy of the Single European Act on the first sight are just minor, as the 
changes it brought were mainly in the economic area, they should not be 
underestimated. Two provisions were inserted: Article 118a and 118b. While Article 
118b was occupied with acknowledging a role for a dialogue between management 
and labour, 118a for the first time allowed for qualified majority voting in the field of 
occupational health and safety, meaning that for the first time reluctant member 
states could be outvoted. This is just one essential outcome of the new Article 118b, 
Falkner (1998: 65) points to another – a phenomenon that Rhodes (1995) called 
“playing the Treaty-base game”. Playing the Treaty-base game means the following: 
as already mentioned, the European Union may just act where powers have been 
conferred to it from the member states, in other words where they have created a 
satisfactory Treaty base for legal action. This is also called the principle of conferral 
and is seen as one of the basic principles of European Law (Chalmers, 
Hadjiemmanuil et al. 2006). But it is often the case that several Treaty provisions 
seem suitable for the regulation of a certain issue. Playing the Treaty-base game 
therefore means choosing the Treaty base that seems most suitable for the own 
policy goals, either one involving a qualified majority procedure or not. With a little bit 
of creativity it therefore became possible to use the qualified majority procedure of 
Article 118a as legal base for a wide set of social policy issues. Accordingly, the 
number of binding acts in the field of social policy from 1987 onwards increased 
constantly (Falkner et al. 2005: 53). 
 
1990-1993 
Already in 1989, the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers was signed. Although it is not binding, the Charter nevertheless gave a clear 
statement of values and guidelines, which the European Union follows. The Charter 
was accompanied by another Social Action Programme, which lead to 15 further 
health and safety directives, one equal opportunities directive and four labour law 
directives (Marginson et al. 2004: 85). Those measures simultaneously showed that 
with the existing legal bases it would not be possible to move much further. As the 
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internal market project created even more pressures also in the field of social policy, 
this topic was brought into the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Maastricht. 
 
The main line of conflict in the field of social policy in Maastricht was between the 
Tory governed United Kingdom and all others: the UK was not willing to accept any 
increased social policy competence at the European level, while the others did not 
want the Treaty amended without the social policy provisions. This conflict for some 
time even threatened to jeopardize the whole intergovernmental conference and was 
more motivated by internal conflicts in the British conservative party than anxieties 
about an interventionist welfare state (Manow, Schäfer et al. 2004). The reasons why 
all other member states had been in favor of new social policy provisions, is 
explained by Falkner, who holds that “both institutional activism and the joint 
processes of preference and identity formation at the European level mattered” 
(Falkner 1998: 86). Finally, a compromise was struck, moving the social policy 
provisions to a protocol annexed to the Treaty and out of the Treaty itself, making it 
legally possible to grant an opt-out to the UK, while the others nevertheless would be 
able to use the European institutions for their purposes. This construction has lead to 
considerable discussions of European law scholars about the uniformity of European 
law (Falkner 1998: 78-79), but in practice it worked, enabling European level action 
to some part even with qualified majority in the following fields and without necessary 
link to the common market as was the case when using Articles 100 and 235 (Manow 
et al. 2004: 27): 
- health and safety of workers  
- working conditions  
- information/consultation of workers  
- equal labor market opportunities and treatment of women and men  
- integration of persons excluded from the labor market  
- social security/social protection of workers  
- protection of workers after termination of their employment contract  
- representation/co-determination  
- employment conditions of third-country nationals  
- subsidies for job creation  
 
Some areas expressis verbis have been kept exclusive member states competence 
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in order to safeguard national interests. These include the right to strike, the right of 
association, and the right to impose lock-outs.  
The Agreement on Social Policy set up in Maastricht brought another important 
novelty – the possibility of setting up autonomous agreements between business and 
labour. This will be described in more detail in the following section. 
 
1994-1999 
In this period, with the possibilities of the Social Protocol in place, a leap in the 
number of European acts in the field of social policy could have been expected. In 
fact, this leap did not happen, although a constant increase can be identified (Falkner 
et al. 2005: 53).  Use of the Social Protocol has been “only reluctant and incremental” 
(Falkner 1998: 147), as member states feared distortions of competition to the 
advantage of the UK. Instead, in many areas solutions under the old procedures 
were sought and for this purpose the level of protection envisaged was lowered in 
order to get the UK on board. In many cases, this was not successful. A new 
dynamic finally arose with the change of government from the Tories to the Labour 
party, when the Social Protocol was transferred into the Treaties with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
 
Since 1999 
The situation of the Treaty of Amsterdam still is in place, as nothing has been 
changed in Nizza. The constant increase in social policy regulation still is present, at 
least until 2002, where the data of Falkner et al. ends (Falkner et al. 2005: 53). Even 
with the Treaty of Lisbon, there would be no substantial changes, although some 
clarifications would be made and some new aspects would be introduced into the 
goals of European policy-making which could be relevant to social policy (Falkner 
2008). 
 
Explanations of the history of European social policy as outlined above have for a 
long time been situated in line with the traditional conflict between 
intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists. While intergovernmentalists (e.g. Lange 
1992) assume that social policy is too important to the member states to allow for 
significant influence of the European Union and that they remain in total control of the 
developments, neofunctionalists hold that “the emergence of a multitiered structure is 
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less the result of attempts of Eurocrats to build a welfare state than it is a 
consequence of spillovers from the initiative to build a single market” (Leibfried et al. 
1995b: 44), which cannot be controlled by the member states. Space precludes a 
detailed description of the two arguments, but what becomes clear is that what was 
outlined in this section – with or without member state control – constitutes the main 
legal base for binding European level action in the social field. Yet there is another 
source to be named. 
 
 
b) The European Social Dialogue  
 
The roots of European level industrial relations date back to the 1970s. Although the 
European business federation UNICE (nowadays called Business Europe) had 
already been founded in 1958, it was not until 1973 that the trade unions followed by 
establishing the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).  With two peak-level 
organizations in place, new possibilities opened up: between 1974 and 1978 several 
tripartite conferences took place, involving UNICE, ETUC, the Commission, and 
representatives of the member states (Falkner 1998: 71-72). There had already been 
one tripartite conference in 1970, but only the involvement of ETUC added the 
necessary stability, as ETUC had an interest in these conferences, since it enabled 
close contact to Council members (Compston and Greenwood 2001: 4-5). But when 
results turned out to be meagre and at the 1978 conference the representatives of 
the member states did not make a single statement, ETUC withdrew from the 
conferences. 
 
From Val Duchesse to the European social dialogue 
When the French Council presidency in 1984 declared the creation of a European 
Social Space as one of its main goals, it also envisaged an important role for the 
social partners, i.e. UNICE and ETUC. During the presidency, UNICE and ETUC met 
three times in Val Duchesse. Although no substantive results were achieved in these 
meetings, when Jacques Delors entered the European stage he invited the heads of 
UNICE, CEEP (the association of the public sector employers) and ETUC again to 
talks at Val Duchesse. Delors wanted to add a social dimension to the European 
integration project with social partner involvement as one of its cornerstones. With 
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backing from the Commission president, this meeting “proved to be the first step in 
what became known as the Val Duchesse period of dialogue (1985-1993), 
characterized by bipartite social-partner activities” (Welz 2008: 248). As there was no 
legal base given for such social partner coordination, the outcomes remained non-
binding, mainly laying down joint positions. But the outcomes were not the main 
achievement of the Val Duchesse period: On the one side, it created something that 
might be called trust between the social partners, which led to a completely new base 
for future agreements. “The intimate involvement of management and labour in policy 
networks resulted in a revised definition of interests and preferences” (Compston et 
al. 2001). On the other side, the policy entrepreneurship of the Commission under 
the lead of Jacques Delors stabilized and supported this development. “Social 
dialogue would constantly be marketed in official documents and brought up in 
meetings and conferences. It seems that a learning and even identity formation 
process was being induced” (Falkner 1998: 73). 
 
The Val Duchesse dialogue received a formal backing with the coming into force of 
the Single European Act in 1987. Article 118b as already mentioned provided for the 
establishment of a coordination procedure between the social partners. French 
proposals to enable the social partners to make autonomous agreements, which 
could be transformed into a regulation or directive, went too far for the other member 
states. Therefore Article 118b in fact just laid down what already had been reality. 
The real brake-through concerning the integration of a social dialogue procedure into 
the framework of the European Union was achieved on October 31st, 1991, when 
during the negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty, UNICE, CEEP, and ETUC 
agreed on a joint agreement to the intergovernmental conference, in which they did 
not just ask for obligatory consultation of the social partners, but also for a procedure 
of autonomous bargaining between the European-level social partners the results of 
which could be transposed into regulations or directives. The wording of the 
agreement was to a large extent copied into the Agreement on Social Policy, which 
via the Protocol on Social Policy became part of the Treaty. Although some 
provisions were changed at the intergovernmental conference (for example some 
additional leeway for Commission and Council was inserted), with the coming into 
force of the Maastricht Treaty, also the social dialogue procedure came into 
operation. 
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With this institutional setting in place, negotiations on specific topics could start, but 
proved difficult. The first two cases to be negotiated under the new procedures dealt 
with the establishment of European Works Councils and parental leave respectively. 
First attempts to establish European Works Councils already had been made as 
early as 1980 (Falkner 1998: 98), but failed due to resistance from the side of 
employers and member states, especially the UK. Nevertheless, the proposal was 
brought up again several times, as especially the Delors’ Commission understood 
this as crucial to balance the negative side-effects of the internal market project. As 
now with the Social Protocol and Agreement qualified-majority voting in the Council 
was in place, it became possible to increase the pressure for an agreement. The 
social partners were consulted, but with a long-standing history of opposition by 
UNICE to this proposal, they finally were not able to agree on a common draft, 
although negotiations looked promising. Nevertheless, the Commission sent a 
proposal to the Council under the Social Protocol to adopt the European Works 
Council directive. The Commission in its proposals tried to stick as much as possible 
to the discussions of the social partners, declaring its willingness to integrate the 
social partners into the policy-making process. 
The parental leave directive was the first social partner agreement to be implemented 
by Council decision. This case compared to the European Works Councils was rather 
uncontroversial, nevertheless some UNICE members questioned the necessity of 
European level regulation on this topic, while ETUC, backed by the Commission, was 
very much in favor of adopting this directive. Welz (2008: 386-389) points to two 
significant reasons, why the topic of parental leave was the first to be negotiated and 
why at this time: first, it was as already mentioned a rather uncontroversial topic, 
without any longstanding history of negotiations in the Council. Therefore the 
Commission asked the social partners not to negotiate on a draft as in the European 
Works Council case, but on a basic outline, enabling more leeway. Second, the 
social dialogue procedure of Article 138/139 EC needed some results, as it was 
feared that the member states during the negotiations in the run-up to the 
intergovernmental conference in Amsterdam could try to do away with the social 
dialogue procedure. 
Those two cases exemplify the problems of the social dialogue procedure, at least in 
its cross-sectoral version. Until September 2008 (European Commission 2009) just 
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three agreements have been implemented via Council directive, three more 
autonomous agreements have been concluded, and two frameworks of action have 
been established. Nevertheless, the amount of informal and non-binding opinions, 
papers, and recommendations – especially in the field of the sectoral version of the 
social dialogue - is high.  
 
Several authors (Dolvik 1997; Falkner 1998; Zheng 2007; Welz 2008) examined why 
the cooperation between the European social partners intensified like it did and 
analyzed the problems it suffers from. Two different sets of reasons have been 
identified. 
 
Ideas and the role of informal institutions 
The core assumption of the corporatist policy community is that over some time the 
shared beliefs and preferences of the actors within the corporatist policy community 
have been changed with reference to normative concepts like the European Social 
Model, which according to Falkner (1998: 77; for a critique see Jepsen and Serrano 
Pascual 2005) consists of at least two major pillars - those are social welfare and 
employment relations. Using this concept enabled shifting “the causal assumptions in 
the policy core”, without substantially touching upon the policy core itself (Falkner 
1998: 202-203). The lack of procedures enabling a structured dialogue between 
business and labour at the European level resulted in a lack of substantive content – 
also called corporatist decision gap – which had to be closed in order to fulfil the 
normative standards set up by the concept of the European Social Model. Preference 
formation within the corporatist policy community therefore aimed at redefining the 
means and instruments of European social policy and intensify them until they 
ultimately influence political behaviour without creating strong opposition by for 
instance questioning the dominant national competence in the field of social policy. 
Then it becomes possible that actors decide against their pure economic interests 
and instead act in order to do ‘something good’ or at least something that is 
welcomed by the peer-group. In the industrial relations literature, the importance of 
values and ideologies as frames of action is especially acknowledged in situations of 
conflict (Budd and Bhave 2008; Gall and Hebdon 2008) and for Ebbinghaus and 
Visser (1997) the attitudes towards conflict resolution between business and labour 
are a distinguishing criterion between different systems of industrial relations. But 
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why? Once such an informal institution is established, with reference to historical 
institutionalism (Hall et al. 1996; Pierson 1998; Pierson 2000) one could expect the 
development of path-dependencies, which reinforce the whole process. These path-
dependencies make it difficult to pursue strategies that are not on the path, leading to 
the stickiness of institutions.  
 
Rational choice and self-interest 
Although Falkner (1998: 151) underlines that “also at the national level the existence 
of a corporatist policy community does not imply that labour and management are 
involved in all relevant decisions to the same extent”, critique of the historical 
institutionalist approach has focused on the meagre outcomes of the social dialogue 
procedure. Compston and Greenwood (2001: 166) even conclude that “the role of 
ideas is marginal” and that they are just used as instrument to pursue the self-interest 
of actors. Changes in the belief system of the actors are denied. These rational 
choice accounts of the social dialogue procedure (some with an institutionalist notion, 
some not) emphasise the role of the shadow of law: “The central social dialogue is 
completely dependent on the capacity and commitment of the Community to bring 
European social policy forward”, summarizes Dolvik (1997: 356). This means that 
social partner agreements are just probable if there is a credible threat that without 
such an agreement there would be a regulatory act nevertheless and in this case the 
social partners would have decreased possibilities of influence. Would this shadow of 
law not exist, especially the business side would have no incentive to reach an 
agreement, as it would produce costs that otherwise, i.e. without regulatory action, 
would not have to be incurred.  
 
c) Development of soft modes 
 
The rise of regulatory acts in the field of social policy does not concern binding acts 
alone, non-binding acts are at least as relevant. In fact, “binding and non-binding 
decisions have developed approximately in parallel” (Falkner et al. 2005). This 
contrasts with the great attention soft modes received within the recent literature. 
Two different stages of research on soft modes like the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) can be separated: first, the theoretical discussion about the origins and 
potential outcomes of soft modes, and second the empirically informed evaluation of 
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the use of soft modes in the European Union. 
 
When we take a look at the history of European social policy, we can observe a 
steady increase in European-level activity in this field as a result of spill-over effects 
from economic integration. At the same time, social policy remains intrinsically 
national, as it lies at the core of definitions of statehood (Maydell et al. 2006: 9 et 
seq.), preventing any big shifts from the national to the European level, as no 
majorities can be found for such shifts. Nevertheless, the pressures on national 
systems persist and at least multi-national coordination is deemed necessary. Soft-
modes are therefore understood as an ideal possibility for compromise and help to 
resolve deadlocks (Schäfer 2006). As distinct features of soft modes, which at the 
same time render them attractive to policy-makers, are seen “broad participation in 
policy-making, co-ordination of multiple levels of government, use of information and 
benchmarking, recognition of the need for diversity, and structured but unsanctioned 
guidance from the Commission and Council“ (Mosher et al. 2003: 64). These 
procedures, collected under the term ‘Open Method of Coordination’, allow for policy 
coordination without far-reaching transfer of policy-making competences, as only 
non-binding measures are taken.  
 
The European Employment Strategy has been the first procedure to take this soft 
form. In the mid-1990s the potential negative effects of the welfare state on 
employment rates started to endanger the financial balance of the welfare system, as 
the usual instruments for keeping unemployment low, i.e. early retirement and 
income maintenance programmes, took an ever-increasing part of government 
spending. The only strategy to effectively counter these tendencies was increasing 
workforce participation, but at the same time due to the fiscal guidelines set up by the 
Economic and Monetary Union, such programmes could not easily be funded. As 
neofunctionalists easily would predict, at some point various actors turned to the 
European level to look for the solution. Creating a centralized welfare regime would 
not have been possible, not only due to member states resistance, but, as Mosher 
and Trubek (2003: 66) suggest also for pragmatic reasons, as “the Union lacked 
competence and capacity for such a daunting task”.  
 
The same authors point to four additional reasons why it was comparatively easy to 
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introduce new modes of governance exactly in the field of employment policy:  
 First, as the unemployment rates kept rising, this was more and more traced 
back to unbalanced economic integration. This train of thought could already be 
found in statements by Jacques Delors, who exactly for this reason pressed for 
a reinforced social dimension already in the late 1980s.  
 Second and following from the former argument, the Commission had already 
pushed for further integration in this field for some years.  
 Third, the signing of the Stability and Growth Pact threatened to further increase 
pressures on national welfare systems.  
 Finally, the 1995 enlargement with Austria, Finland, and Sweden brought three 
new countries into the Union, which were in favour of active employment policy.  
 
As role model for the European Employment Strategy served the multilateral 
surveillance procedure within the Economic and Monetary Union, but without its 
coercive elements. The European Employment Strategy finally found its legal base in 
the new employment title of the Treaty of Amsterdam and in the aftermath served as 
example for the Open Method of Coordination as well in other policy areas, like social 
inclusion and pensions. The expectation was that also in these areas the OMC would 
“be a promising mechanism for promoting experimental learning and deliberative 
problem solving across the EU” (Zeitlin 2005: 8). 
 
It is exactly the learning element that Kröger (2006: 1) tackles in her critique:  
 
„Indeed, one can wonder why the tool box gathered by the OMCs and its non-
bindingness should promote “learning” processes in a politically highly sensitive 
policy area where further integration was and remains judged undesirable for 
reasons of institutional diversity and political and ideological disagreements.“ 
 
Learning is a cognitive process that takes place over a certain period of time. 
Incentives for learning are crucial: if learning is constrained by institutional and 
ideational factors, the incentives have to be even stronger. Here lies the problem: 
due to its informality and non-coerciveness the institutionalization of soft forms of 
governance usually is low, leaving financial incentives the only possible instrument 
(Heidenreich et al. 2008). Eckhardt (2005: 262) comes to a similar result in her 
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analysis of the OMC on pensions and notes that “there are no strong incentives to 
subject oneself voluntarily to the outcome of the OMC on pensions”. But Eckhardt 
also speaks of the creation of a European social policy paradigm, which could result 
from the OMC and in the future build the base for binding actions. But maybe such 
cognitive shifts have already taken place: In a case study on the impact of the 
European Employment Strategy in Germany and France, Heidenreich and Bischoff 
found evidence that the OMC, although in different ways, contributed to a 
“convergence of perceptions, orientations, interpretative schemes and problem-
definitions thus shaping the national reform projects“ (2008: 556). Such a finding 
supports the cognitive Europeanization approach and would strengthen the 
argument, that especially the Commission used the OMC to enter into highly 
sensitive areas of national interest. 
 
Mailand, in another study on the impact of the European Employment Strategy in 
Denmark, Poland, Spain, and the UK concludes that “only to a limited extent has the 
EES had a direct impact on the employment policies of the member states” and that 
there is considerable variation between the various countries (Mailand 2008: 361). 
Although searching for the reasons of this variation has not been Mailand’s primary 
research aim and has not been empirically tested, he lines up three different 
explanatory hypotheses: the compliance hypothesis, the Europeanization hypothesis, 
and the consensus hypothesis. The terminology unfortunately is confusing, as, first, 
the compliance hypothesis only aims at the misfit argument, not mentioning other 
approaches of implementation research. Second, Europeanization is used to 
describe “national actors’ incentive to use the EES strategically” (Mailand 2008: 355). 
This is a very narrow definition of Europeanization, with some elements of what in 
this piece of work would be called opportunity-structure approach and some 
elements of a cognitive approach, as Mailand points to the importance of the “profile” 
of European employment policy in the respective country. Finally, Mailand’s 
consensus hypothesis in fact is the same as his compliance hypothesis, as it focuses 
on the resistance of domestic actors. If we remember the Europeanization model of 
Risse, Green Cowles, and Caporaso, this is step three of their model, called 
mediating factors and more precisely they refer to “multiple veto points” (2001: 9). 
Nevertheless, Mailand’s work is another study that has shown that the EES might 
have an actual impact on domestic policies, may it only be slight though and 
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dependent on a broad array of intervening factors. What is new is that an impact of a 
soft mode of governance not only on a cognitive level, but also shifts of opportunity 
structures are expressis verbis considered possible, while other authors (O'Connor 
2005; Heidenreich et al. 2008) for various reasons only allow for a cognitive impact. 
What could such an influence of soft modes of governance on domestic opportunity 
structures look like? This is especially a topic of external legitimization (Zeitlin 2005: 
16; Mailand 2008: 355). Governments may refer to an OMC as external source for 
policy change and for blame-sharing in order to pursue their own domestic agenda. 
An OMC here is used as a strategic resource of domestic actors. Those must not 
only be governments, also non-governmental actors and especially the social 
partners may use the OMC to strengthen their position. Such shifts may not only 
happen due to normative standards or certain domestic traditions (Falkner, Hartlapp 
et al. 2007; Falkner and Treib 2008), but also via increasing pressures aiming at 
policy-change into a certain direction. Raveaud (2007) in a more economically 
oriented analysis of the European Employment Strategy gives an example how this 
might work. Raveaud especially focuses on the employment systems of Denmark 
and Sweden, which he understands as models of solidarity instead of models of 
competition, and concludes: 
 
„Also, while praising Denmark and Sweden for their high levels of employment, 
the EES criticizes them for their high level of taxes and unemployment benefits. 
The coherence of these social and economic systems, which articulate social 
cohesion with economic efficiency, is not understood by the Commission and 
the Council.“ (Raveaud 2007: 430) 
 
Raveaud’s statement that Council and Commission do not understand the model of 
solidarity could also be framed otherwise, namely that Council and Commission 
deliberately follow the model of competition. For both assumptions no evidence is 
available, but as this is not of any interest in the present context, we can move on to 
assert that there is some societal concept underlying the cornerstones of the OMCs – 
no matter if deliberately chosen or not. At the same time we have seen that the OMC 
has some impact on domestic systems. Therefore, even in areas, where European-
level competence is restricted to soft modes of governance, the European level might 
be used by domestic actors to evoke domestic change, which otherwise would not 
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have been possible. Of course, such a strategy would take a lot of time and a lot of 
question-marks would have to be added, but it helps not to forget about other than 
cognitive effects of OMCs. 
 
 
d) Social policy and the European Court of Justice 
 
The role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the evolution of European social 
policy has often been underestimated. Especially if the respective authors favoured 
state-centred accounts of European integration (Lange 1992; Streeck 1995), there 
was not much space for independent action granted to the ECJ (Garrett 1995; 
Garrett, Kelemen et al. 1998).  Actually, ignoring the role of the ECJ in the 
development of European social policy can only be based on a severe 
misunderstanding of the principles of European law as protected by the ECJ in its 
case law. The line of argument against an independent role for the ECJ in this policy 
field usually refers to the allocation of competences between the various levels, i.e. 
between the European and the national level, in all areas of social and welfare 
policies and highlights the small competence base for European-level action in this 
field. In short: where there is no European level competence, there is no decisional 
space for the ECJ. But if we take a closer look into the history of the ECJ, we realize 
very soon that it is a history of constant widening of European-level competence 
even against the apparent meaning of the Treaties. By establishing the doctrines of 
direct effect and of supremacy, the ECJ already in its early years contributed largely 
to the constitutionalization of the Treaties (Stone Sweet 2005). Direct effect means 
that individual citizens may invoke European law before national courts, as it grants 
individual rights upon them, which national authorities have to consider. In fact, direct 
effect, first established in the famous case van Gend en Loos in 19632, was the very 
moment when the European Union legally was transformed into something not 
known before, as international law per se never grants rights upon individuals. But 
the doctrine of direct effect lacked a provision how national courts should proceed if 
they encounter conflicts between European and domestic rules. Without such a 
conflict rule, the doctrine of direct effect would have been useless, as it could have 
                                            
2 ECJ Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 00001 
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been easily ignored with reference to conflicting national provisions. Therefore 
already one year after van Gend en Loos, in Costa vs. Enel3, the ECJ held that 
European law is supreme to domestic law and that the latter in such a case should 
be set aside. While the wording of Costa vs. Enel was rather vague, leaving many 
questions unanswered, the ECJ refined the doctrine of supremacy in the years that 
followed and even held that European law is supreme to national constitutional law. 
This claim, of course, was heavily contested especially by national constitutional 
courts like the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, but over the years a kind of 
consensus emerged, making future conflict between the courts in this field unlikely 
(Alter 2001; Albi 2007; Charpy 2007). 
Another feature of ECJ case law is important: the ECJ for various reasons proved to 
act pro-integrationist and engage in judicial activism. This became possible as the 
ECJ compared to national courts enjoys a considerable decisional leeway, as the 
ways of disciplining courts used in the domestic context are not available at the 
European level. The only effective way to correct a judgment of the ECJ in fact is 
bound to a Treaty amendment, which requires a double unanimous majority – one at 
the intergovernmental conference and one in the national parliaments during the 
ratification process (Mattli and Slaughter 1998). Maybe the most famous case in the 
field of social policy with an integrationist stance has been the Defrenne case4 in 
1976 (Falkner 1998: 60-63). In this case, a former stewardess of the Belgium airline 
Sabena relied upon the Treaty provisions for equal pay in order to combat 
inequalities in the pay schemes of Sabena. She was able to do so because of the 
doctrine of direct effect. Finally, she won. The judgment actually caused a new era of 
European legislation on anti-discrimination, although “none of the governments had 
in 1957 imagined that twenty years later, national law and individual work contracts 
might be invalidated by legal complaints under Article 119” of the Treaty (Falkner 
1998: 61). Defrenne makes obvious how the ECJ has used the narrow existing 
Treaty foundations in the field of social policy to widen the European level influence 
in this field. Nevertheless, the foundations remained thin, setting borders even to the 
most daring interpretations of the Treaty. But another legal approach opened up the 
whole field of social policy to judicial review by the ECJ: the Court holds that every 
                                            
3 ECJ Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1963] ECR 00585 
4 ECJ Case 43/75 Garbielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aeriénne Sabena [1976] ECR 
00455 
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measure potentially disturbing the aims set out by the Treaties is illegal unless for 
legitimate reasons, which are defined by the Court itself. Even if in its judgements the 
ECJ regularly in principle asserts national sovereignty in the field of social policy, 
national sovereignty ends where the goals of the Treaties start: 
 
„With the intention of realizing the internal market, Community law stimulates 
free movement by removing restrictive national measures even if they relate to 
aspects of the national welfare systems.“ (Lenaerts and Heremans 2006: 102) 
 
This move has been heavily criticised from a democratic point of view, as without 
unambiguous legal base long-standing traditions of welfare distribution within 
countries are shifted, as Scharpf (2009: 30) argues: 
 
„From a normative perspective, what matters is that the Court’s interventions 
are based on a self-created framework of substantive and procedural European 
law that has no place for a proper assessment of the national concerns that are 
at stake, and in which the flimsiest impediment to the exercise of European 
liberties may override even extremely salient national policy legacies and 
institutions.“ 
 
The decisions of the ECJ in the cases of Viking and Laval (Malmberg and Sigeman 
2008) and subsequent judgements, to which we will return later, are the most actual 
examples of this deficit. 
 
At the same time, the ECJ has contributed to the protection of fundamental rights in 
Europe. Already in the late 1960s, in the cases of Stauder5 and Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft6, the Court held that fundamental rights are an integral part of 
European law. Nowadays, still with no binding fundamental rights charter within the 
Treaties, the Court nevertheless has referred to several different sources to derive 
European fundamental rights from (Chalmers et al. 2006: 232 et seq.): the 
constitutional traditions of the member states, the European Convention for the 
                                            
5 ECJ Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 00419 
6 ECJ Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1970] ECR 01125 
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), and the European 
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. Regarding social rights the ECJ has also 
referred to the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and the 
European Social Charter of 1962 (for instance in the already mentioned Defrenne 
case) (De Witte 2005). Fundamental rights are as well regarded as a possible 
legitimate reason for disturbing the principles of the internal market, especially the 
four freedoms (Joerges et al. 2009: 12-13).  
The incorporation of fundamental rights into the body of European law was 
necessary due to constitutional doubts in some member states: if the ECJ did not 
respect fundamental rights in an appropriate way, it would have been up to the 
national constitutional courts to guard the fundamental rights enshrined in their 
respective constitutions. But as the ECJ then fulfilled the requirements and 
established a system of fundamental rights protection that is at least not worse than 
in any member state, those constitutional concerns could be appeased. This 
development can also be seen in the case law of some constitutional courts, 
especially in Germany (Sadurski 2008). 
 
But why at all has the ECJ become that powerful? Even if it enjoys a considerable 
leeway not comparable to domestic courts, why have the latter been so willing to 
accept the guidance of the ECJ? Research on legal integration has brought up 
several possible explanations: first, the self-interest of domestic courts may lead 
them to obey. Second, the incentives for private litigants to “play the Eurolaw game” 
are high. Third, legal expertise of the ECJ is convincing.  
 
Domestic legal systems usually are multileveled, as it has to be possible to make an 
appeal and question decisions of lower courts in higher courts. Sometimes, there are 
as well different branches of the judiciary: administrative courts, civil law courts, 
criminal courts, constitutional courts, and so on. Not in all cases there is a clear 
hierarchy between the various levels and branches. If one understands a single court 
as an institution, with its own set of preferences and values, we can analyze the 
relationship between different courts either as inter-court rivalry (Alter 2001) or more 
generally as pursuit of self-interest (Burley et al. 1993). Adding the European legal 
system to existing domestic judicial systems opens up completely new possibilities 
especially for lower courts to strengthen their position vice versa higher courts. The 
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link between the lower courts and the European level has been identified in the 
openness and flexibility of the preliminary ruling procedure of Article 234 EC, which 
enables (lower courts) or obligates (courts of last instance) to refer to the ECJ all 
matters concerning questions of European law. Accordingly, the ECJ has held 
several times that it is the only body to legitimately rule on questions of European 
law. With such a position, after a preliminary ruling a case in fact is decided, as a 
higher court has only the possibility to refer the case again to the ECJ with a different 
set of questions. This gives lower courts the possibility to act as courts of last 
instance, although they are not, and sometimes they are even able to set aside 
national laws – a competence otherwise only granted to national constitutional 
courts. Those are powerful incentives to cooperate with the ECJ. 
Another reason is the shift in the opportunity structure of private litigants: they may 
use European law to pursue their interests even where the national legal system 
would not grant such a possibility. At the same time, as Mattli and Slaughter (1998: 
186) note, they as well serve the ECJ: 
 
„Without individual litigants, there would be no cases presented to national 
courts and thus no basis for legal integration. The various identities, 
motivations, and strategies of litigants have inevitably influenced the nature and 
pace of integration.“ 
 
The same authors identify two different main types of private litigants: public interest 
pressure groups and large corporate actors. With reference to studies of several 
authors they describe how such groups have used European law to increase 
pressures on national actors in order to induce policy change. Again, the Defrenne  
case already mentioned above serves as an example. Those actors usually are so-
called repeat players that are able to bring several cases before the courts and are 
big enough to get over defeats. Through constantly penetrating national courts with 
their cases, they try to achieve the success they want. 
 
Finally, followers of a legalist approach as Weiler (1991) argue that the legal 
expertise present in the judges and staff of the ECJ is so high, that lower courts and 
national legal practitioners are easily persuaded of the points of view of the ECJ, as  
the knowledge of European law of the former furthermore usually is not that far-
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reaching. But this approach has been heavily criticised (Burley et al. 1993; Alter 
2001). 
 
In the meantime, even the member states themselves have strengthened the ECJ, 
as they are interested in compliance with the established rules and try to avoid 
freerider effects. In other terms, the ECJ acts as powerful agent of the member states 
agreement laid down in the Treaties (Pollack 1997). The ECJ since Maastricht is 
even able to impose penalty payments and lump sums for non-compliance of 
member states with European rules (Chalmers et al. 2006: 360-365). In this way, the 
costs of non-compliance should be increased in order to make it less favourable. 
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3. Shaping European Social Policy without coercion: 
a way to success? 
a) Soft modes in the social field 
aa) Description of soft modes 
 
Above, we have analyzed why soft modes have been introduced into social policy 
making at the European level and have approached the question which outputs may 
be expected from the employment of such new modes of governance. The findings 
up to now suggest that soft modes can indeed have an impact on domestic policies, 
although this impact might be smaller than expected and difficult to proof. 
Furthermore, claims that soft modes replace the classical instruments of European 
policy-making seem to be exaggerated, as the numbers of binding and non-binding 
acts in the field of social policy rise approximately in parallel. This rather indicates a 
development towards a “pragmatic mix” (Barani 2006: 29) of different regulatory 
techniques, where legal instruments are chosen according to the political preferences 
of the participating actors. 
 
In order to assess the potential impact of soft modes on the possibilities of national 
trade unions, we now have to turn to the procedural characteristics of soft modes, as 
we need to know how trade unions can participate in the process leading to the 
adoption and implementation of soft modes. This is the precondition for assessing 
the implications of soft modes, as those then can be examined before the 
background of national systems of industrial relations. 
 
The policy-cycle of soft modes consists of four elements (Trubek and Trubek 2005: 
348): 
 
“1. Joint definition by the member states of initial objectives (general and 
specific), indicators, and in some cases guidelines.  
2. National reports or action plans that assess performance in light of the 
objectives and metrics, and propose reforms accordingly.  
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3. Peer review of these plans, including mutual criticism and exchange of good 
practices, backed up by recommendations in some cases.  
4. Re-elaboration of the individual plans and, at less frequent intervals, of the  
broader objectives and metrics in light of the experience gained in their 
implementation.” 
 
This is as well the procedure laid down in the Treaties (Article 128 EC) for the 
European Employment Strategy (Schäfer 2006: 206), beside the Broad Economic 
Guidelines within EMU one of the role models of the OMC.  Article 128 EC at the 
same time provides – among others – for the consultation of the Economic and 
Social Committee (ESC) and the Employment Committee. The latter consists of two 
representatives of each member state and two representatives of the Commission, 
but according to Article 130 EC has to consult “management and labour”. This rather 
vague formulation aims at the organizations also represented within the European 
social dialogue, but there is no evidence of substantial influence of the social 
partners, as it is mainly a forum for discussion between the member states and the 
Commission. Experiences with the Standing Employment Committee established in 
1970 (Goetschy 1999: 118) show that even with formal participation rights of social 
partners their influence is low in such bodies. With the ESC, the case is not much 
different: although the ESC has a long-standing tradition of representing societal 
interests within the European policy-making process and therefore fulfils an important 
legitimizing function, its impact on legislative proposals lies in the best case in 
correcting technical details (Smismans 2000; Jesús Butler 2008). With other OMCs 
that do not enjoy a Treaty base but are established by Council decisions (e.g. those 
on social inclusion and pensions), a similar picture emerges, as consultation takes 
place on an informal and irregular base (Kröger 2008).  
For the European level, we therefore can summarize that the OMC is a mainly 
intergovernmental process without significant influence of any of the social partners. 
This is not especially surprising given the institutional configuration of the OMC, 
where the main actors are the European Council, the Council and the Commission, 
while all other institutions and even the European Parliament are just allowed an 
advisory role. Nevertheless, the idea of the OMC has as well been to promote better 
deliberation and increase legitimacy in the way of including more societal actors. At 
least for the European level, this goal has not been achieved.  
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Turning to the domestic level, it is with element two of the OMC procedure outlined 
above, the creation of National Action Plans (NAPs), that involvement of the social 
partners may be expected at the domestic level. As Kröger (2008) has shown in her 
case study of the administration of the OMC social inclusion in France and Germany, 
social partner involvement may take place at that stage but is largely dependent on 
the good will of the respective governmental bodies and traditions of public-private 
relations (Falkner 1999). 
 
The incentive for the social partners to get involved in the creation of the National 
Action Plan lies in its potential influence on substantial policies in the respective 
areas, as many OMCs directly touch upon issue areas where social partners are one 
way or another involved, either as those areas are situated in their political domain, 
or as they even are involved in the administration of these systems, as it for instance 
is the case in the northern European states. This holds especially true for the OMC 
social inclusion, the European Employment Strategy, the OMC on pensions, and that 
on health care. All of those policy fields directly touch upon questions of the labour 
market or flanking areas, as pensions are directly linked to contributions from the 
work force - at least in the first pillar of public pension schemes (Eckardt 2005). 
Regarding the OMC on health care, the connection to the social partners can be 
easily established because of the importance of social security systems in healthcare 
as well as in employment policies (Hervey and Trubek 2007; Hervey 2008). It could 
therefore be expected that representatives of labour vie with those of business for 
influence in the creation of National Action Plans, but Kröger (2008: 8) in her study 
could not find evidence supporting this expectation in the long run: 
 
„Yet, while hopes were quite developed that the European strategy could bring 
a new verve to the fight against poverty, enthusiasm about the process has 
decreased over the years as it became clear that the impact of the OMC 
inclusion on policy development was very weak.“ 
 
This would mean that there is a correlation between the potential substantive policy 
results of the domestic part of the OMC process on the one hand and social partner 
or non-governmental participation in general on the other hand. Kröger (2008: 14) 
traces this lack of substantial results back to the lack of political will: “This lack of 
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political will to implement the OMC inclusion at the domestic level reflects the lack of 
political will to go forward with positive integration at the European level.” What the 
social partners therefore would have learned from their participation in the OMC is 
that they should not shift their focus towards the European level but stay with the 
traditional domestic systems, as the European level makes no difference in this 
regard. Such a possible effect of De-Europeanization needs further exploration. We 
therefore now turn to the effects of the OMC on national systems of industrial 
relations and national trade unions. 
 
ab) Effects on national systems 
 
In order to assess the impact of soft modes of governance on national trade unions’ 
possibilities, as outlined in detail above, we have to analyze how those could 
influence national systems of industrial relations by either increasing pressures due 
to misfit between the national and the European model, due to influence on domestic 
opportunity structures, or due to cognitive shifts. As we take the inputs coming from 
the European level as stable, we can search for similar patterns of adaptation within 
the three models of industrial relations we have already defined. So we are able to 
look for some of the reasons leading to the overall transformations taking place within 
national systems of industrial relations in Europe, which have been called converging 
divergence (Marginson et al. 2002). 
The inputs coming from the European level with regard to soft modes are made out 
of different elements, some being of procedural nature like in the case of the creation 
of National Action Plans, some incorporating substantive policy goals like those set 
out by the Lisbon Agenda on which most OMCs are based (Kröger 2006). Although 
the inputs are stable, the domestic starting points are not. While differences in the 
domestic arrangements are a necessity regarding the present research design, those 
differences pose some problems in the evaluation of the outcomes, as we are not 
able to talk in absolute but only in relative terms. We therefore are looking for trends 
and developments supporting the transformation of domestic systems especially 
towards decentralized bargaining and free-market or neoliberal policies respectively, 
those being the main elements of current industrial relations’ and welfare state 
transformation (Traxler et al. 2001; Starke, Obinger et al. 2008). 
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aba) Contestational model 
 
In the contestational model business – labour relations usually can be described as a 
zero-sum game: the gains of one side are the loss of the other side (Crouch 1993: 
32). As institutional relationships are weak not only between business and labour, but 
also in tripartite settings, the state is the dominant actor and intervenes regularly in 
order to solve conflicts between business and labour, which due to the lack of other 
conflict-solving procedures take the form of industrial conflict. Formal participation of 
business and labour in the policy-making process at the same time is weak and non-
binding. How could soft modes of governance now exert pressures on the 
possibilities of trade unions in the contestational model?  
First, we turn to the degree of fit/misfit between the domestic arrangement and the 
European model. Ferrera and Sacchi (2004: 1 - 2) in their analysis of the European 
Employment Strategy and the OMC on social inclusion identify four categories of 
procedural objectives both share: first, vertical integration. This means the close 
coordination of policies at the European level. Second, horizontal integration 
“requiring adequate representation of functional interests and a high level of 
participation of such interests to the decision making process – a policymaking mode 
which might be called governance through social partnership“ (Ferrera et al. 2004: 2). 
Third, cross-sectoral integration aims at resolving the divisions between different 
governmental departments. Fourth, strengthening the institutional capabilities. Both, 
the EES and the OMC on social inclusion provide for the involvement of business 
and labour within the domestic process, but this provision seems to be a mere 
guideline, as their involvement should foster effectiveness. Gold, Cressey and 
Léonard (2007: 20) support this statement and describe the involvement of the social 
partners within the EES as follows:  
 
„This is a much reduced form of collaboration, where social partners appear to 
be co-opted into a process beyond their influence. They do not participate in the 
determination of the objective, as ‘partnership’ has been reduced largely to a 
managerialist façade.“ 
 
If this is the model prompted by the European level, the degree of misfit compared to 
the contestational model would be small, as in the contestational model too the social 
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partners only play the role of an onlooker, who sometimes might be helpful, but most 
of the time stays outside. The choice for the social partners is only one or the other: 
either support the domestic part of the OMC process, including the goals set out 
without their involvement, or stay outside and use industrial conflict as last resort. 
Ferrera and Sacchi (2004: 22) have observed exactly this behaviour in the Italian 
case of the OMC on social inclusion. In her analysis of the implementation of the 
OMC on social inclusion in France, another country assigned to the contestational 
model, Kröger (2006) found the same situation: trade unions only played a marginal 
and informal role in the setting up of National Action Plans, without the possibility of 
substantive influence. 
 
Turning to changes in domestic opportunity structures, pressures might occur even 
without the presence of a considerable amount of misfit. Usually changes in domestic 
opportunity structures are induced by binding acts stemming from the European 
level, as only with the attribution of a binding character it is possible to overcome 
domestic traditions. But Mailand (2008) argues that such a binding character is not 
necessary, as in situations of conflict, where changes in opportunity structures are 
decisive, even soft modes may set a frame of reference that could be used to 
legitimize and strengthen certain positions. Mailand in this context points to the 
importance of political and media debates. These could get especially important in 
the contestational model, as broad public support for the own position might be an 
incentive for the respective government to take a decision that is nearer to the public 
opinion. In his study on the impact of the EES in Spain, he found that public debates 
“often include references to the EES, and the various actors – especially the trade 
unions – have often used the EES strategically in order to back up their arguments“ 
(Mailand 2008: 360). Now Spain is not an example of a contestational model, 
although it shows some of its elements like low union density and fragmentation, but 
nevertheless is usually described as pluralist or even corporatist model (Estivill and 
de la Hoz 1990; van der Meer 1996). But one could use the Spanish example as an 
argumentum a minori ad maius, as if soft modes are used as frames of reference in 
systems where patterns of institutional conflict solution exist, moreover are they 
logically used in systems where such patterns are not present and conflict therefore 
is regular. But this remains only a hypothesis without empirical evidence supporting 
the effectiveness of such a strategy. 
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Most researchers of soft modes agree that they foremost might have cognitive effects 
on domestic systems. But as mentioned above, case studies in this direction show a 
poor delivery of the researched OMCs in this respect, no matter in which underlying 
system of industrial relations. To the contrary, the learning effect might even be one 
of De-Europeanization, as substantive results stemming from an OMC are missing 
and social partners therefore realign their efforts with traditional domestic ways of 
influence. Such effects might be weaker in contestational models of industrial 
relations, as possibilities for participation in the policy-making process are constantly 
rare and social partners are used to not achieving any substantive results. Therefore 
the hurdle to engage in new OMCs or in an altered framework of an existing OMC 
might be lower, as it is still possible to gain from participation, while in pluralist or 
corporatist models compared to the existing participation levels engaging in an OMC 
process would mean a loss of participation possibilities. 
 
abb) Pluralist model 
 
In pluralist models of industrial relations, “the density of interaction rises” (Crouch 
1993: 35). As a consequence of this increase, it becomes more and more attractive 
to business as well as to labour to decrease the amount of conflict present in the 
system. The role of the state is one of abstinence: Resolving conflicts and 
manufacturing consent in the field of industrial relations is understood as challenge of 
the social partners only – the state does not interfere and stays neutral. Taking the 
goodness of fit between this model and European standards into consideration, this 
last point might lead to considerable misfit, as soft modes of governance initiated at 
the European level are foremost directed at state action. We therefore find a situation 
where a member state due to an OMC process is obliged to tackle certain issues 
although they traditionally had been discussed by its social partners autonomously. 
OMC processes therefore would introduce state intervention into pluralist models. 
But this as it seems has not been the case. Heidenreich and Bischoff (2008: 517), in 
their study on the European Employment Strategy, suggest two reasons for this: first, 
the setting-up of National Action Plans has no decisive influence on the formulation 
of national employment policies. If those plans are ultimately irrelevant, no one has to 
be worried about its possible effects. Second and partly explaining this irrelevance, 
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the misfit between the substantive policies enshrined and/or recommended in the 
European Employment Strategy and those already existing in countries with pluralist 
models like the United Kingdom is low. Therefore the need to take action is not given. 
Heidenreich and Bischofs argument is supported by a study of Armstrong (2006) on 
the adoption of the OMC social inclusion in the United Kingdom: although he does 
not focus on social partners specifically, Armstrong analyzes the involvement of 
social NGOs in general (including trade unions) within the domestic OMC process, as 
broad consultation with NGOs is one of the guidelines of the OMC social inclusion. 
Although Armstrong remarks that creating the National Action Plan on social 
inclusion has “redistributed the opportunities both for civil servants and for civil 
society to engage in dialogue on issues of poverty and social exclusion” (Armstrong 
2006: 92), the substantive policy results are not present and that learning effects are 
not present either:  
 
“However, the somewhat cool attitude of the Treasury towards NGO 
involvement in the domestic Lisbon programmes and the concerns surrounding 
the future of the ‘mobilisation’ objective within a streamlined OMC on social 
inclusion and social protection indicate that the battle may be more one of 
maintaining what has been achieved and less one of expanding the scope of 
NGO engagement beyond the NAPincl.” (Armstrong 2006: 94) 
 
If we now focus on changes in domestic opportunity structures and cognitive effects, 
there is not much difference compared to contestational models. Also in pluralist 
models, opportunity structures may shift due to increased access to information or 
the role of European policies in public debates. Nevertheless, this does not seem to 
be of greater relevance, as the latest citation of Armstrong shows as well. Regarding 
learning effects Kröger (2006) has summarized various studies about the OMC social 
inclusion and comes to the result that general assumptions about such learning 
processes cannot be confirmed. Studies about other OMCs like the European 
Employment Strategy and the OMC on pensions have delivered similar results 
(Eckardt 2005; Heidenreich et al. 2008). 
 
abc) Corporatist model 
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In the relationship between business and labour there might come a moment where 
both sides “try to play their conflicts in the context of the pursuit of certain joint 
interests” (Crouch 1993: 39-40). They then move from a pluralist model towards what 
we call corporatism. The high level of business – labour interaction in corporatist 
systems usually is coupled with high organizational density on both sides, enabling to 
burden each other with considerable costs in cases of conflict. Although conflict is 
rare, it constantly looms above the heads of both sides. According to Van 
Ruysseveldt and Visser (1996: 27), it is overlapping and integrative value systems 
that stabilize corporatist systems. This includes common goal-setting. If now goal-
setting is externalized like in the case of OMC processes, those goals might either be 
seen as illegitimate influence or increase the instability of the system, as the benefit-
cost-calculations of either business or labour might change (Crouch 1993: 40-47), if 
domestic procedural standards are not met. While the potential effects of OMC 
processes are high, there is no evidence anywhere in the literature that destabilizing 
effects have actually taken place. Somehow, this comes as no surprise, as it is easy 
to resolve tensions between national and European goals. Hervey for example shows 
how several member states in their National Action Plans either ignore or expressis 
verbis reject goals set out at the European level (Hervey 2008: 110). Such a result 
would have been expected according to the regulatory misfit approach, as misfit is 
too high and therefore it does not disturb the existing domestic path. Instead 
European goals are rejected. As domestic structures are cemented, also shifts in 
opportunity structures are hardly possible. Regarding cognitive shifts, the situation is 
the same as in the other two systems. 
 
ac) Conclusions 
 
Soft modes used in the context of the European Union have been hailed (Schäfer 
2006) as solution to the stagnation of the integration process in certain policy fields 
which are of high domestic concern. Goetschy concluded that „the more nationally 
sensitive a subject and the more difficult to resolve at national level, the more likely 
are member states to become involved in an EU coordination procedure“ (Goetschy 
1999: 133). Nevertheless, many problems have been identified which might obstruct 
the potential of soft modes and by now it seems as if there is academic consensus 
that those problems remained unsolved. In the present context it therefore is not 
 53
surprising that it was not possible to detect any substantial influence of soft modes 
employed at the European level on possibilities of national trade unions – no matter 
in which system of industrial relations. In the present research design it would have 
been a precondition to detect similar developments in all three systems in order to 
conclude that there is some influence. Of course, the potential of some of the OMC 
processes that have been started proved to be high, but could not realize. Procedural 
arrangements largely stayed the same. The only exception is formed by the 
increased access to information, which participants in OMC processes enjoy in 
systems where consultation usually does not take place at all. To speak of the 
creation of issue networks (Falkner 1998: 43) would be exaggerated though, as 
mutual dependencies are missing. Some authors at the same time have detected 
policy change that originated from OMC processes, may it only be slight though. 
Approaches focussing on policy aspects therefore seem to be more appropriate 
compared to those focussing on politics. 
 
b) Social dialogue procedure 
 
ba) Description of the social dialogue procedure 
 
In the second chapter the evolution of the social dialogue procedure and the 
explanations behind the emergence of the social dialogue procedure have been 
described. Now we take a closer look into the procedure that might lead to social 
partner agreements at the European level in order to be able to assess in a next step 
the effects on the national systems along the lines of misfit, changes in opportunity 
structures and cognitive shifts. 
 
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the social dialogue procedure is embedded in 
Articles 137, 138 and 139 of the EC-Treaty, which before Amsterdam have been 
Articles 2 to 4 of the Social Protocol annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht. The 
involvement of the social partners laid down in these provisions consists of several 
elements (Falkner 1998: 82-83): 
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 Obligation to consult: If the Commission wants to put forward proposals in the 
field of social policy (i.e. on the legal base of Art. 137 EC) it is obliged to consult 
the social partners. This consultation has to take place twice and before the 
proposal is submitted: first social partners have to be consulted on the general 
principles of the proposal (Art. 137 par. 2 EC) and if the Commission wants to 
continue, a second consultation has to take place on the details of the proposal – 
again before the proposal officially is submitted (Art. 137 par. 3 EC). 
 
 Autonomous negotiations: Art. 137 par. 4 EC provides for the possibility that the 
social partners together inform the Commission that they want to try to strike an 
agreement autonomously. This means that on the one hand the representatives 
of business and labour have to agree that they want to enter negotiations and on 
the other hand that the Commission for a maximum time of nine months is not 
allowed to pursue the proposal on its own. 
 
 Council decision: If the social partners are able to agree on a joint text within the 
mentioned period of time, they can choose to ask the Council to adopt their 
agreement and thereby incorporate it into Community law – including all 
consequences like jurisdiction of the ECJ. Usually qualified majority is needed for 
such an adoption, except the agreement touches matters which are reserved to 
unanimous decision. 
 
 European wide autonomous implementation: If the social partners are unwilling 
to ask the Council for adoption of their agreement, they also may choose for 
autonomous implementation “in accordance with the procedures and practices 
specific to management and labour and the Member States” (Art. 139 par. 2 EC).  
 
 Domestic autonomous implementation: According to Art. 137 par. 3 EC national 
governments may entrust the representatives of business and labour in their own 
countries with the implementation of acts adopted in the field of social policy. In 
such a case, the national government just has to secure that the deadlines for 
implementation set out within the act in question are met. 
 
 55
This is a very powerful set of possibilities social partners may use at the European 
level. One has nevertheless to be careful to state that those provisions enable 
autonomous bargaining of the social partners at the European level:  
 
“Although there is an accepted convention that Council may not amend social 
partner agreements presented to it for ratification, it does have the power to 
reject them and to request the Commission to put forward a new legislative 
proposal through the ‘normal’ legislative procedure.” (Compston 2001: 9) 
 
Important in the present context is furthermore the major role of business and labour 
at the national level in this process. This role is further underpinned by the recent 
developments in the social dialogue procedure, which shifted from striking ‘hard’ 
agreements adopted by Council decision to ‘soft’ autonomous agreements with 
autonomous implementation. Gold, Cressey, and Leonard (2007: 20) conclude that 
“the location of social dialogue has been redirected away from the EU intersectoral 
and sectoral levels towards ‘decentralization’ at the national level” and that this is a 
result of the general shift in the area of social policy towards soft modes of 
governance, ultimately weakening the role of the social partners as their involvement 
in soft modes is largely decreased compared to the social dialogue procedure. One 
might ask how this is possible, as it could on the first view not be in the interest of the 
European-level associations to return competences to the national level. But if one 
takes a look at the internal decision-making processes of BusinessEurope on the one 
side and of ETUC on the other side, it is absolutely clear that the national member 
organizations are eager to control every move of their European umbrella 
organizations, leading Dolvik (1997) to characterise ETUC as “loose alliance of 
national peak associations” (p. 171), which even after its reorganisation in 1991 was 
not able to considerably move away from decentralism, and BusinessEurope (UNICE 
at that time) as marked by a “strong ‘intergovernmentalist’ legacy of consensual 
decision-making” (p. 180). Nevertheless, there has been some success: three social 
partner agreements concerning parental leave (1995), part-time work (1997), and 
fixed-term contracts (1999) have been adopted as directives by the Council. From 
1999 until 2009, no agreements have been sent to the Council for adoption, as the 
social partners – starting with the agreement on telework – preferred to choose 
autonomous implementation. Two more such agreements followed, the last one in 
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2007 on harassment and violence at work (European Commission 2009: 105). In the 
middle of 2009, a revised version of the parental leave agreement has been sent to 
the Council for adoption. It has to be mentioned, that this information just refers to the 
cross-sectoral form of the social dialogue. In the sectoral European social dialogue, 
social partners in more than thirty different sectors also engage in negotiations, with 
a considerable amount of output (European Commission 2009: 110-113). Therefore, 
since 1991 social partners at cross-sectoral and sectoral level have committed 
themselves to various goals they have commonly set. They would not have been 
able to do so without the support of their national member organizations, as the short 
side-step into the internal decision-making processes of the two largest social 
partners has shown. One might therefore assume that the social dialogue procedure 
has not been without effect on the domestic systems. It is to those effects we now 
turn to. 
 
bb) Effects of social dialogue procedure on national systems 
 
Assessing the effects of the social dialogue procedure on the possibilities of national 
trade unions faces some problems, as the ways of influence differ largely due to the 
several possibilities that are open to the social partners. As those range from ‘hard’ 
adoption through the Council until ‘soft’ autonomous implementation, it is not possible 
to make statements for the social dialogue in general. In the present context we 
therefore separate between the soft and the hard outputs of the social dialogue. 
Apart from that, the approach will be the same, regarding all three ideal-types of 
national systems of industrial relations behind each other, looking at the degree of 
misfit, the changes in domestic opportunity structures and at cognitive shifts within 
each of the systems. 
 
bba) Contestational model 
 
Comparing the European social dialogue, which created the possibility to close the 
“corporatist decision-gap” (Falkner 1998: 75-76) at the European level, with the 
contestational model of industrial relations does not reveal too many similarities, as 
cooperation between business and labour is a precondition for the emergence of 
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corporatist patterns (Crouch 1993: 39-40), while contestational models are 
dominated by the adversarial behaviour of the actors involved. In this sense, misfit is 
very high and adaptational pressure alike. But as path-dependencies and the 
stickiness of institutions prevent ‘revolutionary’ breaks within long-used traditions, this 
pressure is not going to have any effect. So the theoretical assumption goes. But one 
must not forget that the social dialogue procedure itself does not directly impose 
binding acts on the national systems, it always needs intermediary actors – be it the 
Council or the national representations of business and labour themselves. Choosing 
the first alternative would mean that the process of implementation is analogous to 
every other Community act, involving foremost governments, if they do not choose to 
delegate implementation to their own social partners (Art. 137 par. 3 EC). If 
implementation of social partner agreements follows the traditional paths of the 
community method, the degree of misfit would indeed realize, as those 
representatives of labour not used to collective bargaining in an institutionalized 
manner would need to turn to their European umbrella organizations and enter a new 
mode of cooperation. But this following the basic assumptions of the regulatory misfit 
approach would not be realistic, as they would prefer to resist those ‘external’ 
pressures. We will come back to this in the following section. 
 
If the second alternative, autonomous implementation, is chosen, the domestic social 
partners themselves intermediate, enabling them to make adaptations to the 
European-level agreement in line with their domestic traditions, which reduces the 
degree of misfit. Furthermore, because of the double involvement of the national 
social partners in the policy process, a higher level of commitment could be 
expected. Double involvement means that the representatives of business and labour 
are first involved via their European umbrella organizations in the creation of the 
agreement and then again at the national level in its implementation, which usually 
needs an additional agreement. Autonomous implementation might follow several 
different ways, as the implementation report of the agreement on telework adopted 
by the Social Dialogue Committee on June 28th, 2006, shows (ETUC, UNICE et al. 
2006): either another autonomous social partner agreement, or a collective 
agreement with legally binding force, or a legislative act by the government on 
demand of the social partners, or – finally – mere guidelines and recommendations to 
lower levels of bargaining at sectoral or company level.  
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If one looks at the implementation of the agreement on telework in countries which 
are usually assigned to the contestational model like Italy, France, Greece, and 
Portugal (Ebbinghaus et al. 1997: 337)7, one finds surprising results, as in three of 
these countries implementation was carried out by collective agreement. In France 
and Greece, the government in addition assigned erga omnes effect to those 
collective agreements, making them binding upon all employees in those countries 
(European Commission 2008). Similar results can be found regarding the 
implementation of the social partner agreement on work-related stress, where 
collective agreements have been signed in France (inter-sectoral) and in Portugal 
(sectoral), with negotiations still going on in other countries (ETUC, BusinessEurope 
et al. 2008). 
 
Even in contestational models, collective agreements - as we see - are sometimes 
agreed upon. Now this is something that does not fit into the adversarial picture of 
the contestational model. What thus seems to be an anomalous situation indeed is a 
result of the logic beneath the contestational model. Crouch in his “Theory of 
Exchange” of the contestational model (Crouch 1993: 31-35) has argued that 
basically business – labour relations in this system are a zero-sum game, where the 
gain of one side automatically matches the loss of the other. Incentives for 
cooperation are just given if the costs stemming from a potential agreement are lower 
than the costs a potential conflict would produce. But as in case of conflict usually 
both sides suffer in one or the other way, contestational models in fact realize 
negative sum games, as no matter who in the end wins, the potential benefit of 
victory will be decreased by the conflict costs. It would therefore be rational if both 
sides try to reduce conflict costs. But Crouch mentions three scenarios where this is 
not going to happen: first, one side might think that in the long run it will get a lower 
share of conflict costs by pursuing conflict than its opponent. Second, one side might 
think that the conflict costs could be increased to an amount that destroys the conflict 
capacity of the other side. And third, one side might think that those costs the other 
side saves in the present conflict will increase its capacity in the next conflict. A key 
element in all three of these scenarios are the expectations of the involved actors 
                                            
7 Ebbinghaus and Visser also mention Spain, but as the discussion in van der Meer (1996) shows, Spain has 
transformed in a corporatist direction. 
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and their prediction of future developments. Here, the involvement of the European 
level might make a substantial difference. 
 
Making predictions about possible costs of conflict is a hard job, but as conflict for 
sure imposes some costs, it would be better to prevent conflict except in those 
scenarios mentioned above, where at least one side expects increased benefits from 
conflict. But here again a judgement about potential costs and benefits has to be 
made. Autonomous social partner agreements at the European level include that 
there has been agreement on the question whether or not business and labour may 
profit from such an agreement. Although it is not clear what exactly the benefits or 
potential costs of non-agreement are, it is clear that neither side would have had 
agreed at the European level if it would have been to its disadvantage. Therefore, the 
three scenarios avoiding cooperation in contestational systems will not come into 
effect: 
Regarding the first scenario, it must be clear to domestic social partners that by 
waging conflict in their state, they will not succeed in influencing the overall 
relationship between business and labour in Europe. Therefore they cannot expect to 
get more concessions in the long run than their opponent, they would be moreover 
burdened with conflict costs as well. Therefore the first scenario is not a reason for 
non-cooperation.  
What concerns the second scenario, it is absolutely unrealistic to destroy the conflict 
capacity of labour (to destroy business is not really an option to labour) in all member 
states by just waging conflict in one country. As long as there are enough other 
member states where cooperation is the dominant procedure, there is no incentive 
for business in the contestational model to wage conflict, as again they would just 
have to carry the conflict costs. 
 
From those first two scenarios it becomes clear why autonomous social partner 
agreements might influence domestic systems although it seems as if the degree of 
misfit is too high in order to expect successful transformation. The key lies in the 
framing of the domestic negotiations by the European level agreement. It thus 
becomes possible to set a standard level of agreement to which the domestic social 
partners might return if they are unable to make a proper cost-benefit calculation of 
deviation from the European-level proposal. The European social partner agreement 
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therefore serves as compromise that has been struck before negotiations even have 
started at the national level. 
 
If we now turn to the last scenario, we also have to take into account how the 
domestic opportunity structures might be changed: conflict around issues already 
agreed upon at European level would lead to a zero sum game regarding the conflict 
costs, as both sides are able to call upon the European level to intervene – or just 
have to wait as finally the Commission has made clear that it shares the goals the 
social partners have set out in their agreement. The side that blocks the transposition 
(i.e. the domestic agreement) would just be able to gain some time by this strategy, 
at the same time having to carry the costs. If the benefits from getting more time are 
higher or the expected costs stemming from European level intervention are lower 
than the conflict costs, this nevertheless might be a reason not to cooperate. 
 
Another effect of autonomous social partner agreements might be found at the 
cognitive level. As has already been mentioned, the agreement of business and 
labour at the European level might have an effect on the cost-benefit-calculation of 
the involved actors. At the same time, there could also be cognitive effects. If one 
assumes that the loyalty between domestic and European representatives of 
business or labour is higher than that between domestic business and domestic 
labour, the positive attitude of the European level representatives towards a proposal 
might take away doubts about the content and benefit of the proposal. Due to the 
adversarial climate between business and labour in the contestational model, this is 
most likely in contestational systems of industrial relations. In this sense, the loyalty 
of domestic actors would be with the efforts of their European counterparts, which 
they do not want to jeopardize. 
 
bbb) Pluralist model 
 
Characteristics of pluralist models of industrial relations are an abstentionist role of 
the state, weakness of centralized bargaining institutions, and a low associational 
density on both sides (Visser and van Ruysseveldt 1996). Nevertheless, interaction 
between business and labour takes place at lower levels and is institutionalized to 
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some extent. The reason for this institutionalization lies in the potential conflict costs: 
if these rise above a certain level due to increased strength of one side (usually 
labour) or due to increased interaction, both sides will come to the conclusion that 
they in the long run would profit more from modest cooperation. The goal of this 
cooperation therefore lies in avoiding conflict (Crouch 1993: 36) instead of achieving 
shared social or economic goals like in the corporatist model. 
 
If we now, first, try to analyze the degree of misfit between the pluralist model and the 
European social dialogue, we again have to distinguish between the path of 
implementation that has been chosen. If European social partner agreements are 
implemented by a Council decision, they in fact are addressed at member states’ 
governments. It is up to them to secure implementation either by law or instruct their 
national social partners to engage in negotiations. In the pluralist model, the state 
therefore has to act as procedures to attach erga omnes effect to social partner 
agreements usually are missing because of the principle of neutrality of the state in 
industrial conflicts. What has started as social partner agreement at the European 
level in this way becomes an incapacitation of the social partners at the domestic 
level. As this is not different to any other acts of Community law in the social field, we 
will consider these aspects in the section on harmonization. 
 
Autonomous implementation of European social partner agreements by the national 
social partners faces similar problems, but state intervention is not necessary and it 
is therefore possible to stick to the principle of neutrality. The lack of centralized 
bargaining structures poses a serious problem though: how could nation-wide 
implementation of European social partner agreements be secured despite of highly 
fragmented bargaining structures? As the road of coercion is blocked on every side, 
non-binding instruments like recommendations are the only possible approach. But 
even the usage of non-binding instruments at the national level is a considerable 
innovation: the incentives of European social partner agreements are strong enough 
to prompt tripartite action at the national level where such coordination was not in 
place before.  
 
“The UK industrial relations system makes no provision for formal cross-industry 
collective bargaining, and the CBI and TUC [the peak associations of business 
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and labour; author’s note] do not negotiate such agreements on behalf of their 
members. There was thus no precedent for a more robust instrument which the 
UK social partners could have used to implement the Framework Agreement.” 
(European Commission 2008: 33) 
 
Why tripartite action? The implementation in the United Kingdom of the European 
social partner agreements on telework on the one side and on work-related stress on 
the other side show that in both cases the government played a considerable part, 
although it did not interfere directly in the negotiations. In the case of work-related 
stress, the responsible public authorities provided funding for dissemination activities, 
themselves engaged in dissemination by creating information material, and installed 
working groups. In this case, the government’s activism could be motivated to some 
extent by the finding that central and local government are among the five sectors 
with the highest levels of work-related stress (ETUC et al. 2008: 26).  
This pattern of tripartite non-binding action can also be found with regard to the 
telework agreement: here the UK social partners jointly published a ‘guidance 
brochure’ which incorporated the provisions of the European agreement. On the one 
side, the social partners themselves draw the attention of their members towards this 
brochure, on the other side the government has published the brochure as well. 
The weakness of this approach is obvious, as due to the non-binding character of the 
brochure it is completely unclear if its content will be embedded into work-contracts 
or collective agreements at all. Unfortunately, research on actual implementation is 
missing. 
Nevertheless, the emergence of cooperation patterns at the central domestic level 
seems to be the result of adaptation pressures stemming from the European level. 
Three explanations are possible:  
 either the autonomous implementation of European social partner agreements 
reduces the misfit to such an extent that it is still strong enough to induce 
change but does not prompt resistance, or  
 the domestic opportunity structure has been changed, or  
 cognitive effects have persuaded the relevant actors to move on with 
implementation according with European standards. 
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The misfit approach has good arguments on its side: while the autonomous 
implementation enables the national social partners to act within the paths laid by 
their own systems, nevertheless the European level has set the agenda and 
prompted action on this issue, while otherwise it most probably would not have been 
a priority topic. But if the national social partners would have been able to ignore the 
European proposal, why did they nevertheless introduce central coordination? Or 
asked differently: what exactly is adaptation pressure, if there are no coercive 
measures to sanction non-compliance? 
 
In order to answer this question we take a closer look at domestic opportunity 
structures. In the usual situation of the pluralist model it is completely up to business 
and labour to resolve their conflicts or to negotiate agreements. If conflict resolution 
or negotiations fail, state intervention is most unlikely. This has in the case of the 
United Kingdom been described as “a system of collective laissez-faire” (Visser et al. 
1996: 43). With the state as neutral actor, the industrial relations system presented 
itself as encapsulated subsystem, where the logic of the system could work without 
external disturbance. Adding the European level therefore means that the 
government could have to act in policy fields, which beforehand were assigned to 
social partner regulation. Now this is for sure the case with acts of Community law, 
but autonomous agreements of the European social partners are not sanctioned 
directly. But it has to be remembered that even with autonomous social partner 
agreements, the ‘shadow of the law’ still is alive. This means that if one country fails 
to implement the autonomous agreement properly, the Commission might still 
consider the goals of the agreement as important enough to submit a new legislative 
proposal – this time by means of Community law. Either European business or labour 
would then be in the position to accelerate this process by not agreeing to start social 
partner negotiations again. It then would depend on the Commission’s position and of 
course on the necessary majority in the Council. All in all, free-riding is not an 
alternative to domestic social partners, as in the long run they would have to cope 
even with issues that made part of autonomous social partner agreements in the first 
place. In a long-term perspective, this makes a strategy of blockade unattractive, as 
long as intervention of the Commission looms. 
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Finally, cognitive effects might stem from the involvement of the national 
representatives of business and labour within their European umbrella organizations. 
As with the social dialogue procedure in place at the European level, the 
cooperational patterns there could induce learning effects at the national level as 
well. This would mean that in certain areas where negotiations have taken place at 
the European level, loyalty with the representatives of the own side could lead the 
domestic actors to easier accept the standards set at the European level. 
 
bbc) Corporatist model 
 
One of the most important differences between pluralist and corporatist models of 
industrial relations is the degree of centralization of the collective actors of business 
and labour. While in pluralism, the structure of business associations and trade 
unions is fragmented, in corporatism it is concentrated (Visser 1996c: 28). This 
concentration enables bargaining that includes a long-term perspective and the 
pursuit of common goals. Moreover, due to their powerful situation, social partners in 
corporatist models have a wider array of possibilities at their disposal, which 
especially includes inter-sectoral collective agreements negotiated at the level of 
national peak-associations. Nevertheless, in implementing the social partner 
agreements on telework and work-related stress, the social partners in corporatist 
countries followed completely different paths. What is striking is the high amount of 
non-binding measures that have been taken by corporatist social partners: 
recommendations and guidelines to lower bargaining levels have been used as 
instruments in Austria (final agreement yet missing), Denmark, Germany, Finland, 
and Sweden, sometimes accompanied by collective agreements at the sectoral level, 
sometimes not. In the case of the implementation of the telework agreement in 
Sweden, the national-level social partners agreed on common guidelines how to fulfil 
the provisions stated in the European agreement. Astonishingly, the representatives 
of labour sometimes have been satisfied with mere informational activities:  
 
“In other cases, the matter has been discussed between the social partners and 
employers have taken the responsibility of informing their members of the 
provisions of the EU framework agreement so that they serve as guidance 
when concluding an individual agreement on telework.” (ETUC et al. 2006: 9) 
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That the Swedish representatives of labour leave the protection of individual 
employees to their employers even in a model where as well labour as business act 
integrative is a surprise, but it brings us to one possible explanation of the reluctance 
of social partners in the corporatist model to implement European standards with 
hard law as collective agreements. What countries in the corporatist model share is a 
high level of protection of individual employees. This level is far higher than those 
levels granted to employees in contestational or pluralist models. But agreements 
struck at the European level always are a compromise between the various systems 
present in Europe, so that in the end the corporatist level of protection for sure will 
not be reached. Fully implementing the European standards therefore would mean 
that the level of protection in corporatist models in fact is decreased, although those 
standards aim at protecting employees. Therefore the degree of misfit is a mixture 
between the good intention of the European agreement and its substantial 
provisions.  
Non-binding measures therefore are a welcome tool, as especially labour does not 
want to risk to endanger levels of protection already achieved, but at the same time 
might miss the opportunity to grant increased protection to workers in circumstances 
not thought about, for instance non-regular jobs. The decision, whether additional 
protection is necessary, therefore is left to lower levels of bargaining or even to the 
individual employee, as centralized organizations except for homogenous sectors like 
public administration (e.g. the collective agreements in this sector in Sweden) are 
obviously not able to account for all potential costs and benefits in these new 
situations of work. This is the rationality underlying the pluralist model for a long time 
already: decentralized bargaining fits the requirements of business and labour better. 
Acting in such a way might prove dangerous for trade unions: If the central 
organizations of labour are not able to negotiate satisfying agreements, the individual 
employee might want to have more leeway in his contractual negotiations with his 
employer, building up pressure to deregulate the working relationship even more. 
Such cognitive effects in the beginning might not endanger the whole system, but 
start transformations, which might lead to a different system of industrial relations. 
Crouch (1993: 38-40) has lined up three situations where the foundations of the 
corporatist model would be upset: 
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 First, increasing the levels of protection of the individual employee due to its 
positive connotation is a shared goal of business and labour. If business wants to 
achieve another more conflictual goal, it just has to establish a direct connection 
between the conflictual goal and the common goal. If business is able to 
reasonably argue that without agreeing on the conflictual goal the common goal 
would be in danger, pressures on labour  to agree are high, even if they otherwise 
would not have agreed. If such a strategy becomes obvious, the base for long-
term bargaining would be diminished. 
 
 Second, it is a hard job to determine whether an issue has the potential to be a 
positive-sum game and therefore one that could be shared by business and labour 
together. If the costs of one side are deemed too high, there will not be 
cooperation. The creeping decentralization of bargaining could induce 
considerable costs at least for trade unions, although they originally intended to 
raise the levels of protection of individual employees. 
 
 Third, if the decentralization has already gone too far, there could be not enough 
left to bargain about – at least at the central level. 
 
Of course, all three of those scenarios are far away from being reality in the 
corporatist model, but they show the potential effect of inputs from the outside of the 
domestic industrial relations system. 
 
bc) Conclusions 
 
While soft modes of governance in the form of the Open Method of Coordination do 
not create pressures on domestic systems of industrial relations, the soft approach of 
the European social dialogue and the corporatist policy community do so. In all three 
different models of industrial relations we have found developments that were set in 
motion by autonomous social partner agreements at the European level. Although at 
first glance those developments are not the same, as in two cases there is pressure 
towards increased centralization, while in one case we find pressure towards 
decentralization, all three systems despite their differences might converge towards 
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each other. This convergence at the moment might be restricted to issues at the 
edge of the employment relationship, but the same issues will get more important in 
the future as they make part of general trends in the employment relationship like 
individualization and increased regulation.  
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4. Social vs. economic sphere – which place for 
workers’ interests? 
 
a) Harmonization in the social and other fields 
 
aa) Description of the Community method 
 
Although binding legislation - as has been shown above - also happens as a result of 
the social dialogue procedure, the instruments used there are the same as in the so-
called Community method. This term refers to the regular decision-making 
procedures at the European level, where under involvement of the European 
Commission, the Council of the European Union, and the European Parliament, 
legislative proposals in the field of the EC-Treaty are made into law as regulations or 
directives. The EC-Treaty in Article 249 also mentions a third category of binding acts 
called decisions, which have binding force only upon an individual person and are 
especially important in competition law. The procedures leading to the adoption of a 
legislative proposal may differ considerably, especially with regard to the involvement 
of the European Parliament, but there is a general trend towards increased 
involvement of the European Parliament (Chalmers et al. 2006: 111-120).  
Regarding the representation of workers’ interests in particular and of the social 
partners in general, an important distinction has to be made between those 
legislative acts that are based on the social policy provisions of the EC-Treaty and 
those that do not. The reason is simple: one of the guiding principles of European law 
is the so-called principal of conferral (also called principal of attachment). It has its 
legal base in Article 5 EC where it is stated: “The Community shall act within the 
limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to 
it therein.” The European Union does not have general law-making power, it always 
needs a legal base within the Treaty in order to act, as only then the member states 
have agreed upon transferring some of their legislative powers to the supranational 
level. But the restrictions to national sovereignty member states are willing to accept 
differ from policy field to policy field, as some of them are of more importance to 
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domestic politics than others. In every policy field covered by the Treaty, we therefore 
find a different amount of competences, different procedures, and different actors. 
The social dialogue procedure only exists within the limits of the social policy 
provisions of the Treaty. The extent of the social policy provisions is described in 
Article 137 par. 1 EC: 
 
“With a view to achieving the objectives of Article 136, the Community shall 
support and complement the activities of the Member States in the following 
fields:  
(a) improvement in particular of the working environment to protect workers' 
health and safety;  
(b) working conditions; 
(c) social security and social protection of workers; 
(d) protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated; 
(e) the information and consultation of workers; 
(f) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and 
employers, including co-determination, subject to paragraph 5; 
(g) conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in 
Community territory; 
(h) the integration of persons excluded from the labour market, without 
prejudice to Article 150; 
(i) equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities 
and treatment at work; 
(j) the combating of social exclusion; 
(k) the modernisation of social protection systems without prejudice to point (c).” 
 
Read alone, this list except for wages includes the most important areas of the 
employment relationship. But if this is the legal base for social policy, what at the 
same time means that the member states already agreed to integrate those areas, 
why is the degree of integration in the overall field of social policy not higher? The 
answer comes in the subsequent paragraph of the Treaty: only with respect to the 
points (a) to (i) is the European Union allowed to adopt binding acts at all. Combating 
social exclusion and the modernisation of social protection system therefore is limited 
to coordination measures (cf. the part in this thesis on soft modes).  
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Even within the areas where binding legislation is possible, the rules of procedure 
may hinder legislation. In the cases of social security and social protection, job 
protection, workers’ representation, and third-country employees, an unanimous 
decision of the Council is necessary in order to adopt measures in this areas. This 
makes it rather hard to reach an agreement (Pierson et al. 1995: 8-9). Also the social 
dialogue procedure is limited to those areas where the European Union has 
competences at all. As has been mentioned, it is not the case that social partner 
agreements are changed by the Council members, but nevertheless they might be 
rejected. It is therefore a good idea to stay within those limits set by the potential 
resistance within the Council. This means that although the social dialogue 
procedure grants considerable powers to the social partners, the scope where it 
could be used is limited to a rather small area given the magnitude of policy fields 
outside of social policy where the European level actually has a role, especially 
market integration, and the social partners are not involved, although considerable 
pressures on social policy stem exactly from those fields. 
 
But how does social partner participation in general and workers’ participation in 
particular look like in other areas than social policy? For sure, the social dialogue 
procedure forms the most influential mode of participation of the social partners at 
the European level, but beside this procedure, there is a considerable gap of 
participation possibilities of the social partners. In fact, there is just one formal 
involvement provided for in the Treaty – the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC). About two thirds of the Committee members are representatives 
of business and labour, the remaining third is reserved for various non-governmental 
organizations (Jesús Butler 2008: 564). The EESC has mere advisory status, but this 
advisory status exists in most policy fields covered by the EC-Treaty. In 30 cases (for 
a list see Chalmers et al. 2006: 129), consultation with the EESC is compulsory, 
meaning that it is not possible to adopt a legislative act without having heard the 
EESC before, although – of course – being heard does not mean to be able to make 
changes to proposals. Changes may just be suggested, as is the nature of an 
advisory status. In any other field, where there is no obligation to consult the EESC 
according to the Treaty, the European Commission, the Council and the European 
Parliament may nevertheless consult the Committee, if they deem this appropriate. 
The EESC itself in addition to this has the possibility to “issue an opinion on its own 
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initiative” (Art. 262 EC). Taken together, the EESC has the unique power to give an 
opinion on all matters of the Treaty and therefore on all legislative proposals. But its 
position remains weak and during the Delors era it was judged that the EESC “was 
too weak to fulfil the role of a social partners’ committee” (Schroeder and Weinert 
2004: 203). Beside those formal consultation procedures, informal patterns are 
constantly present in European law-making (van Schendelen 2005; Greenwood 
2007). Nevertheless, institutional power establishes the frame in which those informal 
processes take place. The privileged position within the whole European law-making 
process of the social partners can be based upon the same arguments that led to the 
emergence of the European social dialogue – foremost legitimacy and effectiveness. 
If there is by far more procedural participation of social partners in the social policy 
field than in other fields, adaptation pressures on domestic systems of industrial 
relations stemming from hard law could be expected to be lower in those fields than 
in other fields, as social partners should be able to oppose problematic provisions 
there more powerful than otherwise.  
 
ab) Effects of the Community method on national systems 
 
Hard law in the social field usually takes the form of directives, which have to be 
transposed into national law within a certain period of time provided for in the 
directive itself. As we have seen, the way of implementation is left to the member 
states: they may adopt new or change existing legislation or ask the domestic social 
partners to reach an agreement on the implementation by collective agreements, 
which then might be attached with erga omnes effect by the state. There are differing 
assumptions on the effect of social partner involvement in this transposition process: 
on the one side it might be expected that social partner involvement leads to better 
law-making and increased implementation success, as the societal base of regulation 
is broader. On the other side, social partner participation increases the amount of 
(arguably factual) veto-players (Héritier 2001) and therefore makes the transposition 
process more difficult, leading to various problems due to lengthy discussions and 
blurred solutions. As Falkner et al. (2005: 304-305) have shown in their study on the 
implementation of various social policy directives, none of those two assumptions 
seems to be true in general: “Our empirical results indicate that there is no 
systematic relationship between a certain category of social partner involvement and 
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a particularly good or bad transposition record.” What matters therefore are the 
specific circumstances of the case, but within the framework which is set by the 
model of industrial relations in which it takes place. 
 
aba) Contestational model 
 
In the contestational model, the relationship between business, labour and the state 
is one of hierarchy: the state is clearly dominant and regularly has to resolve the 
enduring conflicts between business and labour that stem from the fragmentation on 
both sides of industry. Possibilities for collective agreements exist on paper, but in 
practice they are hard to achieve. Of course, autonomous collective agreements are 
always possible. Problems arise around the question of erga omnes effects and 
judicial protection: To achieve the widening of the applicability of collective 
agreements to all employees and opening judicial protection in the courts, state 
action is necessary. Collective agreements therefore have to be declared as owning 
erga omnes effect by the respective constitutional bodies. In most cases this is done 
by governmental decision or decree (Leiber 2005). But in the contestational tradition, 
collective agreements nevertheless are the exemption to the rule of state legislation, 
as the obstacles to cooperation are too high (Crouch 1993: 31-35). 
When it comes to the implementation of European directives in the field of social 
policy, differences to the usual patterns can be observed in countries with a 
contestational model, especially when the social partners at the European level had 
negotiated those directives according to the social dialogue procedure. In Spain, Italy 
and Greece, the transposition of the Parental Leave Directive started in an unusual 
way, as Falkner et al. (2005: 254-257) point out. In all three countries there are 
indicators that directives stemming from the social dialogue procedure possess a 
normative value and promote a role model of industrial relations. Such indicators 
could be found in autonomous social partner efforts to implement the directives, 
government efforts to promote autonomous implementation (Spain) and the creation 
of bi- and tripartitie bodies (Greece). Although most of these efforts failed for various 
reasons, it is clear that the procedure applied at the European level can have an 
effect on the national industrial relations system. Nevertheless, those effects must 
not be overestimated, as the Spanish example shows in more detail, where despite 
 73
of government incentives the social partners were not willing to engage in 
negotiations: 
 
“But obviously neither side estimated the possible gains for their clients or the 
advantages for strengthening the social partners’ national position as being any 
greater than the potential costs of the conflicts they expected to occur over how 
to implement the soft-law provisions of the Directive.” (Falkner et al. 2005: 255) 
 
It has to be mentioned that the substantial level of protection foreseen in the directive 
and the level of protection already existing in Spain were more or less the same. 
Adaptation pressures therefore have been low, leading to the situation that no shifts 
in the cost-benefit calculation of the social partners were induced.  
 
The Italian example shows how European directives have an influence on domestic 
opportunity structures: the social partners used the incentives coming from the 
European level to upload the discussion and struggle for a complete renewal of the 
existing regulations (Leiber 2005: 192). This has been possible, as Leiber argues, 
due to the fact that the European social dialogue served as role model for the 
procedures envisaged to implement European directives in the social field, 
remarkably not only those originating from the social dialogue procedure. A finding 
that supports the idea behind the ‘corporatist policy community’ (Falkner 1998). This 
development comes in combination with a general transformation of the Italian 
industrial relations system going on since the 1990s (Visser 1996a). As well the 
Italian social partners as the Italian government have taken measures that move the 
Italian system of industrial relations towards more cooperation. According to the 
“theory of exchange” of Crouch (1993: 35), if “for some exogenous reason the 
density of interaction rises”, “both capital and labour are likely to decide that, in the 
long run, they would stand to gain from a reduction of conflict”. By promoting 
cooperation the incentives stemming from the European level could be such an 
exogenous reason and therefore ultimately lead to a shift away from a contestational 
model of industrial relations. 
 
abb) Pluralist model 
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In the pluralist model the density of interaction between business and labour is 
higher, with bargaining taking place at company and sectoral level but without cross-
sectoral coordination due to weak peak associations (Visser 1996c: 37). The 
abstentionist role of the state prevents state intervention in case of conflict, but also 
means that both sides of industry are blocked from access to governmental decision-
making, as there is big trust in the principles of the free market that finally will 
contribute to the best solutions without state influence. Of course, informal relations 
between the social partners on the one side and the government on the other side 
exist. Taking the United Kingdom as an example shows that it highly depends upon 
the governing party how informal relations look like. Nevertheless, they remain weak 
compared to other forms. 
Adding the European level, a new channel of influence for both sides of industry 
opens up, especially when we talk about the European social dialogue procedure. In 
the last chapter, we already have discussed some of the key influences of the 
European level on the pluralist model, especially the strengthening of centralized 
structures and the doom of long-term blockade. The picture that evolves is that taking 
the “Brussels route” (Greenwood 2007: 30 et seq.) seems more promising to the 
social partners of pluralist models than pursuing solutions at the national level. This is 
the result of two parallel factors: first, there is a considerable gap between the 
domestic possibilities and those at the European level, as only the European level 
grants access to state power and authority. This is a new opportunity structure that 
enables the social partners to exert pressure on their national governments even if 
they are in a weak position in the domestic arena. Second, the misfit between the 
extent of social partner participation at the national and at the European level 
increases pressures on national governments to strengthen the involvement of 
national social partners, as this is seen as part of good governance.  
 
Those two factors have been supported by the findings of Falkner et al. (2005: 254) 
regarding the role of British trade unions and business associations in the 
transposition of social policy directives: “The government wanted to profit from this 
insider knowledge at the implementation stage and thus had an interest in holding 
intense discussions with those who had been sitting at the negotiation table in 
Brussels.” Here, again, the European level participation contributes to a stronger role 
of social partners in the domestic arena. 
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abc) Corporatist model 
 
Although all systems belonging to the corporatist model share that their social 
partners pursue common long-term interests, there might nevertheless be differences 
in the role of the state (cf. the difference between the various definitions of 
corporatism and social partnership in chapter 1). While especially in the 
Scandinavian systems the state has a rather abstentionist role, in Austria and 
Germany it is tripartite bargaining with a strong role of the state – at least when it 
comes to implementation. These differences have been accounted for in the EC-
Treaty with the so called ‘Christoffersen clause’ (Falkner and Leiber 2004: 247) that 
provides for autonomous social partner implementation of social policy directives. 
Autonomous implementation means that the social partners conclude collective 
agreements that cover as much of the workforce as possible. As trade union 
affiliation in Scandinavian countries is very high, coverage of collective agreements 
usually is above 80 per cent. Nevertheless, in the transposition of social policy 
directives in Denmark and Sweden, it became clear that the Commission is not 
willing to accept the exclusion of any worker from the scope of the directive due to 
non-affiliation with a trade union and therefore in the case of the working time 
directive transmitted a Reasoned Opinion to the Danish government, threatening with 
infringement procedures before the ECJ (Falkner et al. 2005: 245). The result was 
that the Danish government adopted complementary legislation to include even those 
workers that are not affiliated with a trade union. Such a step was contrary to the 
traditions of the Scandinavian systems, but does not directly influence the underlying 
mechanisms of the industrial relations system. Nevertheless it shows that even 
corporatist systems may be influenced by European level industrial relations that are 
made out of many corporatist elements as well. Therefore, misfit is low, but 
opportunity structures are dramatically changed, as actors might want to increase 
their power with assistance of the European level. That’s how the official complaint 
filed by two small Danish trade unions to the European Commission in the case of 
the working times directive can be explained.  
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ac) Conclusion 
 
Hard law is transforming national systems of industrial relations towards a European 
standard – at least in the field of social policy. In all other fields that are not covered 
by the social dialogue procedure, most of the pressures leading to this transformation 
are missing, as the position of the European level social partners is considerably 
weaker. But if the social partners play an important role in the law-making process at 
the European level, the pressures on domestic systems are directed in the same 
way. The contestational and the pluralist model of industrial relations could therefore 
change insofar, as the role of the social partners gets more important and that they 
form an increasing part of the domestic law-making process as well. In the corporatist 
model, which is the most similar to the procedure applied at the European level, 
pressures are felt towards tripartite bargaining, moving the national corporatist 
systems away from autonomous social partner action. 
 
b) Spill-overs from the economic sphere: Case law of the ECJ 
 
ba) Description of the ECJ’s case law 
 
Apart from soft modes, the social dialogue procedure and harmonization by means of 
hard law, there is a fourth category of instruments available to the European level to 
potentially contribute to change in domestic systems of industrial relations: judicial 
law-making. In chapter 2 it has already been described how the ECJ contributed to 
the evolvement of a real supranational polity by constitutionalizing the Treaties. Now 
we focus on the role of the ECJ with respect to industrial relations in general and 
trade unions in particular. As our starting point we use the existing case-law of the 
ECJ with regard to trade unions and collective bargaining, two fields that have been 
highly contested in Community law in recent time. The leading decisions in this 
respect are those in the cases of, first, Viking Line8, and, second, Laval or Vaxholm9 
                                            
8 ECJ Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line [2007] 
ECR I-10779 
9 ECJ Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767 
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(for a detailed description of the facts see Davies 2008; Malmberg et al. 2008; 
Joerges et al. 2009).  Azoulai in short summarizes what those cases are all about: 
 
„However what makes these cases interesting is not their complexity, but the 
uncertainty involved. That uncertainty concerns a problem which is fairly simple: 
can the exercise of the social rights to negotiate and of collective action 
protected by the national constitutions of some Member States preclude the 
exercise of an individual economic freedom guaranteed by the EC Treaty?“ 
(Azoulai 2008: 1335) 
 
In both cases the litigants have been companies, while their opponents have been 
trade unions. In both cases, the litigants asked the ECJ to declare industrial action 
taken by the trade unions illegal on grounds of breaches of Community law, 
especially restrictions to the freedom of establishment. In both cases, in the end the 
judgements have been more in favour of the litigants’ side. As Catherine Barnard put 
it simply: “Socialism has been dumped.” What emerges after those judgements and 
as well gets clear from the subsequent case-law (Joerges et al. 2009: 18) are several 
cornerstones with serious impact on the legal possibilities of trade unions: 
 
- Applicability of the EC-Treaty: 
 
Even before the mentioned judgments had been handed down, it was already 
accepted that social partners must respect Community law when they conclude 
collective agreements, as otherwise it would have been too easy to circumvent the 
obligations imposed by the Treaties and other European acts. Therefore since 1976 
and the judgement in the well-known Defrenne case10 the ECJ constantly holds that 
those provisions of the Treaty having direct effect also extend their validity to 
agreements concluded by the social partners in order to regulate the employment 
relationship. As nowadays nearly all Treaty provisions except for the “most open-
ended and aspirational” (Chalmers et al. 2006: 369) seem to be capable of having 
direct effect, it comes as no surprise that collective agreements have to obey 
Community law. What comes as a surprise nevertheless is that industrial action 
taken - as in the present case - by trade unions has to fulfil this requirement as well. 
                                            
10 cited above nr 4 
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This is even more puzzling, as the EC-Treaty speaks of “representation and 
collective defence of the interests of workers and employers” (Art. 137 EC) as a 
Community competence, but in Article 137 para. 5 it is said expressis verbis that “this 
article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to 
impose lock-outs”. But this has not been an obstacle to the ECJ in similar cases 
before and it wasn’t one in Viking and Laval either, although there are serious doubts 
if it is really possible to apply the pre-existing case-law to trade unions engaging in 
industrial conflict. Azoulai (2008: 1341) comments this development in the case-law 
of the ECJ by simply stating that “it means that no types of rules or regulations, 
whatever the field or the underlying intention, are a priori excluded from the field of 
the EC Law’s empire”. The key question with regard to Viking and Laval was, 
however, if industrial conflict may be understood as regulating the employment 
relationship like collective agreements do (Azoulai 2008: 1344). The ECJ answered 
in the affirmative. 
 
- No restrictions to the common market: 
 
As soon as Community law has to be obeyed, the whole array of Treaty provisions 
and secondary law opens up. Especially the four freedoms guaranteed by the EC-
Treaty may not be limited. Therefore, the ECJ in Viking and Laval moved on and tried 
to figure out if the action taken by the respective trade unions was capable of 
potentially or actually disturbing the rights granted to the litigants by the Treaty. As in 
both cases, the litigants were companies having their seat in another member state, 
the answer of the ECJ to this question also was yes. 
 
- Right to strike as fundamental right: 
 
A restriction of rights conferred by the Treaty to individuals is possible if there are 
legitimate reasons to do so. The Treaty itself regularly cites public health, public 
security and public order as legitimate reasons. The protection of work places of 
course is not mentioned as legitimate reason expressis verbis, but fundamental rights 
like the right to strike might protect the pursuit of this goal. The ECJ has already in 
earlier cases like Schmidberger11 decided that fundamental rights could legitimize 
                                            
11 ECJ Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-05659 
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breaches of the free movement provisions. And indeed the ECJ with reference to 
various sources like the European Social Charter and the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights accepted the right to strike as a fundamental right protected by 
Community law. 
 
- Proportionality of actions taken: 
 
Although the ECJ acknowledged the right to strike as fundamental right, it did not say 
that there are no limits to the use of this right. Industrial action has to be proportional. 
Over the years, the ECJ has developed methods to test this proportionality. 
Astonishingly, the Court used one of the strictest tests and asked if there would have 
been less restrictive means. Davies (2008: 141) argues that „the way in which the 
ECJ uses proportionality in this setting substantially undermines the significance of 
its recognition of the right to strike as a fundamental right“. 
 
Taking everything together, the case-law of the ECJ has severely shifted the balance 
between business and labour in the industrial relations system. In the next part, we 
will explore this in more detail. 
 
bb) Effects on national systems 
 
In every system of industrial relations, the patterns of cooperation or non-cooperation 
between the social partners over time have created a legal framework, which assigns 
a certain role to the state in case of conflict. This role usually is one of formal 
neutrality, as without an unbiased state a system of industrial relations in fact would 
be obsolete, as there would be nothing to negotiate about. As an expression of this 
neutrality, all European states have granted fundamental rights to both sides of 
industry, which protect business and labour equally from illegitimate state action. 
Those fundamental rights are - among other social rights – basically the right of 
association, the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs (De Búrca, De Witte 
et al. 2005). As we have seen those are exactly the fields expressis verbis excluded 
from Community competence in the EC-Treaty. Of course, restrictions to 
fundamental rights are possible, as calling upon fundamental rights cannot be used 
to legitimize illegal activities. The most prominent example of such a restriction has 
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its origins in voluntary social partner behaviour: if there is a valid collective 
agreement, those agreements usually include a so-called peace obligation, which 
prohibits industrial action of both sides while the collective agreement is in force. 
Industrial action taken despite this obligation is illegal and may therefore be met with 
state power. Historically, this has - especially in the corporatist model - been an 
instrument to secure agreements once they are struck, as such an obligation makes 
industrial action by non-affiliated workers impossible. It is with the right to strike and 
this peace obligation, where the case-law of the ECJ hits the hardest. 
 
bba) Contestational model 
 
Systems belonging to the contestational model have the strongest tradition of 
industrial conflict (Visser 1996c: 12) with a high rate of workers involved in 
stoppages, but with a low union density at the same time (Visser 1996c: 15). Due to 
the adversarial attitude of both sides of industry towards each other, the relevance of 
the rules governing industrial conflict is obvious. As has been mentioned, in most 
member states the right to strike is a constitutional right (Warneck 2007). This is 
especially true for those member states whose industrial relations systems are 
assigned to the contestational model. In France and Italy, the right to strike is granted 
to individual workers, while in Greece trade unions must participate in order to render 
a strike legal. The main restriction on the right to strike, however, is that it has to be 
legal. In other words, the constitutional right to strike does not protect illegal strikes. 
But what is a legal strike and what is not? In the case-law of the member states’ 
courts and the domestic laws respectively, there is a rich amount of situations, where 
strikes are illegal. This is especially the case if they are against a peace obligation 
laid down in a collective agreement or if they are violent, endangering the 
constitutional order, and so on (Warneck 2007: 9-11). Since the Viking and Laval 
judgments, it is also clear that breaches of Community law found by a court may 
render a strike illegal. This means that as soon as there is a cross-member state 
element given in the situation of the case at hand, Community law has to be 
respected within the narrow limits set out by the ECJ we described above. It could 
therefore be possible that a strike by French workers directed against a French 
employer is legal, while the same strike would be illegal if the employer were Dutch. 
To explore what such a situation means to the industrial relations system, we have to 
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ask what the consequences of illegal strikes are. Usually those are the potential 
termination of the individual work-contract, obligation to pay damages, and 
prosecution according to criminal law. Such consequences are directed at the 
individual worker or at the trade union, but if Community law is applicable, even the 
state might be held responsible, as the Spanish Strawberry case of the ECJ12 shows 
(Chalmers et al. 2006: 195): 
 
“French farmers launched a violent campaign targeting the importation of 
Spanish strawberries. Their action involved threatening shops, burning lorries 
carrying the goods and blockading roads. The French government took almost 
no action either to stop these protests or to prosecute offences committed as a 
result of them. While the acts stopping the import of Spanish strawberries were 
performed by private actors – the farmers – and while the relevant provision of 
EU law, Article 28 EC, imposed obligations only on states not to prevent the 
free movement of goods, the Court ruled that France had breached EC law.” 
 
Now is Spanish Strawberrys a very drastic example, as the action of the farmers 
without doubt was unlawful. But nothing prevents this reasoning to be applied to 
other cases of illegal strikes, no matter on which grounds. Although the court in 
another case accepted that fundamental rights could be a reason why member states 
do not have to police the EC-Treaty, this nevertheless is just possible as long as the 
strike action is legal also under Community law. If it is not, member states have to 
intervene and end the illegal strike. Otherwise they would have to pay damages 
themselves to those the strike was directed at (Harlow 1996). In other terms, we can 
call this an adaptation pressure: due to the degree of misfit between the European 
rules and the domestic rules regarding industrial action, there are contradictions 
between both systems that cause costs for the actors involved. Those costs form the 
incentive to reduce the misfit, but only as long as the costs of adaptation are not 
higher than the costs of maintaining the misfit. In the contestational model, state 
intervention is not unusual, but it is political intervention and not intervention with 
police forces. This could have two basic consequences for the industrial relations 
system: either the willingness of the state to accommodate its trade unions could 
rise, as strikes should be prevented or business takes the opportunity to “smash 
                                            
12 ECJ Case C-265/95 European Commission v France [1997] ECR I-06959 
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organized labour once and for all” (Crouch 1993: 35). While the first scenario implies 
that the costs to accommodate trade unions are lower than the costs of maintaining 
non-compliance, the second scenario shows how domestic opportunity structures 
might be changed by European initiatives. Although misfit in this respect is more a 
precondition than a necessary requirement (Börzel et al. 2003a), it enables domestic 
actors to pursue strategies that would not have been able without the European level. 
In our present context, this means that it is very easy for business to construct a 
situation where Community law applies and therefore the limits to the right of strike 
are narrower. In fact, business could use this to dictate agreements with labour, as 
the most effective possibility of labour to resist this would be strike action, but „the 
more the strike restricts the employer’s free movement rights — and thus the more 
effective it is from the union’s perspective — the harder it will be to justify“ (Davies 
2008: 142-143) in light of the case-law of the ECJ.  
 
What is even worse is that such a case-law supports the cognitive impression that 
“European integration represents a form of ‘subversive liberalism’, in which 
transnational liberalization undercuts national social models” (Wincott 2003: 289). 
This third effect is the same in all three models of industrial relations, as we will see. 
What has been said about the right to strike in this context stems mainly from the 
Viking judgement. Although the reasoning on the right of strike is the same in Laval, 
this judgement deals too a large extent with the role of collective bargaining. What 
the ECJ in short states is that autonomous collective bargaining that does not cover 
all employees is not a suitable instrument to implement directives. It could only be 
such an instrument if complementary legislation is adopted that grants erga omnes 
effect to the agreement. In the contestational model this is not a problem, as the state 
always has to act to make collective agreements work, as union density is too low in 
order to make other methods possible. Insofar, the case-law of the ECJ in Laval has 
a conserving effect on the contestational model. The level of interaction between 
business and labour according to Crouch’s Theory of Exchange might never reach 
the point where cooperation becomes the preferred option. Accordingly, the industrial 
relations system will remain unstable. 
 
bbb) Pluralist model 
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The effects of the Viking and Laval case-law on the pluralist model could be expected 
to be low, as the right to strike in this model is not a fundamental right and therefore 
there already are ample restrictions to this right (see for the United Kingdom Visser et 
al. 1996: 52-55; and Warneck 2007: 70-71). But it could be otherwise, as Davies 
(2008: 146) notes: “Of course, it is already the case that the law on industrial action is 
highly restrictive. Secondary action is clearly unlawful, for example. But Viking adds a 
new set of restrictions in cases with a cross-border dimension.” In the pluralist model, 
the state is abstentionist and neutral. It is a model of industrial voluntarism, where 
business and labour have to resolve their conflicts on their own. Therefore, “English 
law’s approach to the regulation of industrial action seeks to avoid ‘politicising’ the 
courts by preventing them from ruling on the merits of the dispute” (Davies 2008: 
146). But this is exactly what now has to be done in the light of the Viking and Laval 
judgements. As it is also up to the domestic courts to enforce Community law, now 
the British courts would have to assess whether or not industrial action taken is 
proportional regarding the restrictions it means to the rights granted by the EC-
Treaty, especially the four freedoms. Here again we find the same situation as with 
business in the contestational model: just inserting a cross-border element to the 
dispute enables them to set stricter legal borders to any kind of trade union action. 
How this will finally transform the respective industrial relations system cannot be 
answered here, as further research would be necessary. 
Regarding collective agreements, the reasoning of Laval makes autonomous 
bargaining impossible that aims at performing functions defined as state competence 
by EU law. As central bargaining structures are not given in the pluralist model, 
autonomous bargaining has not been an alternative until now. It will not be in the 
future either, if the ECJ does not change its mind. 
 
bbc) Corporatist model 
 
Both cases, Viking and Laval, took place in corporatist countries, i.e. Sweden and 
Finland. Scandinavian corporatism differs from other corporatist countries insofar, as 
the social partners are more or less autonomous in their bargaining from the state, as 
long as they do not “create major problems, for instance, unemployment, inflation, 
low growth, industrial unrest” (Visser 1996b: 189). At the same time, unions opposed 
mechanisms of statutory extension of collective agreements to non-affiliated workers, 
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as they feared that union membership could become unattractive (Visser 1996b: 
195). Such mechanisms still do not exist, but at least in Sweden changes have been 
made to the law regarding posted workers (Strath, Tejning et al. 2008). This has 
been argued to be the least invasive solution in Swedish labour law. Applying the 
misfit approach, this would mean that adaptation pressures stemming from the ECJ 
judgements have been too high to lead to actual transformations and that efforts 
have been made to somehow accommodate the ECJ, especially when it comes to 
the right to strike. Also with opportunity structures, business as in the other models of 
industrial relations has now a new possibility available, but this is only true for single 
companies, while associations of business still have to deal with very powerful trade 
unions in the domestic arena. Nevertheless, this could have a destabilizing effect, in 
case single companies move away from their associations, as they could gain more if 
they act on their own and for example move one of their undertakings to another 
member state. 
 
bc) Conclusion 
 
Judgments of the ECJ are the hardest possible instrument that exists on the 
European level. Although the decisions are directed at a single situation and a single 
case, the reasoning adopted by the Court in this case might have enormous impact 
on subsequent decisions as it might serve as precedent and should not be 
underestimated regarding its impact on the development of Community law in 
general. The same happened with the reasoning in Viking and Laval, which now has 
to be considered as established practice of the Court, as two more cases follow the 
same line (Joerges et al. 2009: 1-2). Furthermore, it is not possible to deviate from 
the case-law with reference to domestic specialities, as the case-law is part of 
Community law, which according to the ECJ itself must be applied uniformly in every 
member state. Only different circumstances of the individual case may deliver a 
different result, but those differences have to be accepted by the Court. Therefore, 
differences in national traditions, if they are not accounted for within Community law, 
do not matter. The reasoning in Viking and Laval does for sure not account for 
national traditions, as the balance that existed in the national systems between the 
interests of business and those of labour, no matter how it looked like, at least in 
cross-border situations has been deferred by a system derived from Community law. 
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While in the national systems, restrictions to the right to take industrial action must go 
only so far as it is necessary, this is different in cases where Community law has to 
be applied, as then industrial action must only go so far as restrictions to the four 
freedoms are appropriate to make use of fundamental rights, do not go beyond what 
is necessary and are only legal if there are no lesser means. Those criteria taken 
together are known as proportionality test. Davies (2008: 141) argues “that the way in 
which the ECJ uses proportionality in this setting substantially undermines the 
significance of its recognition of the right to strike as a fundamental right”. This 
reversal of the burden of proof has the same effect in all of the three models of 
industrial relations: the possibilities of trade unions to take industrial action are 
decreased and therefore their power in the negotiations with business is weakened. 
At the same time, states are in an unpleasant situation as well, as they by 
Community law are expected to intervene, if the industrial action taken is illegal. 
Those parts of business in national systems of industrial relations, which reject 
cooperation with labour, get into a more favourable situation. As soon as the 
company is resettled or creates subsidies in other member states, the applicability of 
Community law is given and the possibilities of trade unions to offer resistance 
become weaker than they would be in the national system. Such a strategy could 
even be pursued without the consent of other parts of business and insofar the case-
law of the ECJ as established in Viking and Laval has a potentially destabilizing 
effect on national systems of industrial relations, as such an adversarial attitude 
leads towards a contestational system. Even more, with such instruments provided 
by the case-law at hand, the centralization of bargaining is endangered as single 
companies might judge that their individual benefits of acting according to a strategy 
covered by the case-law are higher than their costs of non-compliance with their 
peak association. This would have a destabilizing effect insofar, as the power of the 
central level to conclude agreements would decrease, especially if those are 
foremost autonomous agreements without involvement of the state. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Trade unions, still embedded in their national traditions of interaction with business 
and the state, may be in a process leading towards a more convergent system of 
industrial relations in Europe. It is nothing new that industrial relations systems 
everywhere in the world face various pressures. Such pressures lead to an overall 
tendency within industrial relations in developed market economies that has been 
described as ‘converging on divergence’ (Bamber et al. 2008). What is new in 
Europe, though, is the considerable influence of a supranational polity on the 
systems of its member states. Although already at the very beginning of the 
European integration process some elements of social policy have fallen within the 
scope of European level action, it took several years and a considerable extent of 
spill-over before the European level, with the Social Protocol annexed to the 
Maastricht Treaty, obtained a consistent legal base for action in the field of social 
policy (Falkner 1998). With this legal basis and the possibility of autonomous 
bargaining for social partners enshrined in it, at least the formal requirements to close 
the corporatist decision gap present at that time were available. With such 
procedures in place, the European level has several instruments at its disposal to 
directly influence the social policies of member states. As social policy is necessarily 
interwoven with industrial relations, action of the European level in this field is also of 
importance to the developments in industrial relations. Nevertheless, there are few 
scientific statements on effects of European level procedures on national trade 
unions and the respective systems of industrial relations in the member states.  
 
The research question of this thesis asked how European integration could influence 
the possibilities of trade unions within their national systems. Although no empirical 
research is contained in this paper, a discussion of the pressures national systems of 
industrial relations face because of European integration allows for statements about 
this influence. If European integration makes a difference, the pressures it poses on 
national systems of industrial relations should be comparable regardless of the type 
of industrial relations given. As in the literature (Crouch 1993) three ideal-types of 
industrial relations are identified (the contestational, the pluralist, and the corporatist 
model), those are used in the present context as well.  
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At the European level, there are four different modes available to influence national 
systems of industrial relations. These modes of influence are: soft modes of 
governance, the social dialogue procedure, the Community method, and the ECJ’s 
case-law. The pressures on national systems of industrial relations resulting from 
European level activity can then be assessed by discussing the potential effects of 
those modes of influence on the ideal-types of industrial relations. 
 
Table 3: Overview of results 
 Soft Modes Social 
Dialogue 
Procedure 
Community 
Method 
ECJ Rulings 
Contestational 
Model 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Pluralist 
Model 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Corporatist 
Model 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Source: own; yes/no indicates whether or not pressures are given 
 
 
The first mode of influence of the European level on national systems of industrial 
relations, soft modes such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), only in 
limited settings might be the source for adaptation pressure: where consultation of 
trade unions is generally low in the national policy-making process, like in the 
contestational and the pluralist model, OMC-processes might initially enhance such 
consultation in fields in which the OMC is employed. But the typical lack of 
substantive policy results stemming from OMC processes (Kröger 2008; Mailand 
2008)  impedes learning effects, as the incentives for trade unions to engage in the 
consultation process in the end are not given.  
In the corporatist model, the failure of soft modes to influence domestic systems 
might be based on their narrow scope: soft modes externalize goal-setting and 
therefore directly constrain the possibilities of social partners in corporatist models to 
choose their common goals independently. But without mechanisms to secure 
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compliance with those goals, the adaptation pressures on the corporatist model are 
too low to induce change. 
 
Regarding the second regulatory method, autonomous social partner agreements, 
the setting is different: with the introduction of the social dialogue procedure by the 
Social Protocol annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, European social partners attained 
the possibility to strike autonomous agreements that would either be transformed into 
European law by a Council decision or autonomously implemented by the domestic 
social partners. As the first is similar to the Community method, it has been dealt with 
there. The latter faces some serious problems: implementation even of autonomous 
social partner agreements must fulfil the requirements set up by the Commission. But 
not in all member states are there centralized bargaining structures that work 
effectively. In fact, it is characteristic of the contestational and pluralist model that 
central institutions are weak as powerful peak-associations are missing.  
Nevertheless, autonomous social partner agreements have to be transposed. Central 
bargaining institutions are therefore strengthened, as they are called upon to strike 
an agreement regarding the transposition of the autonomous social partner 
agreement. Concluding such an agreement is made easier due to the double 
participation of national trade unions in this process: while they are first participating 
via their European umbrella organizations in the negotiations at the European level, 
they again get the chance to negotiate at the national level. Engaging in such a 
process has clear benefits as the degree of influence is very high. At the same time, 
the position of the state is influenced by two phenomena: first, by what Falkner 
(1998) calls the “corporatist policy community”. Social partner participation in this 
concept is seen as part of an ideational system shared within the European Union, 
and has a high normative value. Second, and accounting for the critics of Falkner’s 
approach (Compston et al. 2001), the state also profits in a rationalist sense from 
supporting autonomous social partner implementation: The potential costs of having 
to take, implement and enforce a state-lead decision on the transposition of an 
autonomous social partner agreement may be (partly) saved, while the state 
nevertheless maintains considerable influence on the entire process. State action 
due to low union density remains needed to include all workers of the country (erga 
omnes effect) into the social partner agreement. Taken together, autonomous social 
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partner agreements exert pressures to transform contestational and pluralist systems 
towards increased tripartite concertation.  
 
For the corporatist model, these potential effects could lead to the opposite: as the 
levels of protection in the corporatist model usually are already very high, the 
potential risks for trade unions accompanying the transposition of European 
autonomous social partner agreements are also high. Therefore, in the existing 
examples of such transposition in corporatist systems (ETUC 2006 and 2008), the 
social partners opted for non-binding measures in order to transpose the 
agreements. In the long-term, such a strategy could lead to increased 
decentralization and ultimately endanger the pillars of the corporatist system, as 
fragmentation increases and common goals shared by the social partners become 
blurred. 
 
If we now turn to the third regulatory technique, the Community Method, the potential 
effects should be higher, as this instrument is the first one to be of binding nature. 
But the discussions in this thesis suggest that potential effects are more or less to the 
same extent achieved by formal as well as informal coercion. With regard to the 
Community method, similar pressures as discussed with regard to autonomous 
social partner agreements have been found in the contestational and the pluralist 
system, as social partner involvement in the policy-making process has been 
supported by the European level inputs. This might have its reasons in the procedure 
that has been employed at the European level, as those pressures have especially 
been present when transposing results of the social dialogue procedure, even if they 
have been incorporated into EU law directly by Council decision. The idea of social 
partner involvement nevertheless is not restricted to results of European social 
partner negotiation, as also some other acts in the field of social policy have been 
delegated to the social partners for national transposition. This indicates that an 
involvement of the social partners is seen as normative standard of good law-making.  
In corporatist countries, where social partner involvement is a key element of the 
industrial relations model, again the effects of European level incentives have gone in 
the other direction: while social partner involvement usually is welcomed, too much 
leeway for the social partners does not seem to be supported by the European 
institutions – neither by the European Commission, when it comes to potential 
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infringement proceedings, nor by the European Court of Justice as will be explained 
later. Such a situation especially hits the Scandinavian countries as they have a long-
standing tradition of autonomous social partner activity, while in other corporatist 
countries like Austria and Germany the role of the state is much more proactive. 
Insofar, here again incentives stemming from the European level towards tripartite 
concertation can be found. 
 
If we now turn to the fourth and last mode of influence used in this paper, the case-
law of the ECJ, the legal need for uniform applicability of the reasoning standing 
behind such decisions makes it impossible to account for particular national traditions 
or sensitivities. Noteworthy, the recent case law of the ECJ regarding trade unions 
has focused on corporatist countries. Nevertheless, those decisions also have effects 
in the other models of industrial relations. Therefore, as the reasoning employed in 
these cases by the Court may be seen as established practice of the Court, there are 
several points regarding the right to strike that might impede trade union action. Two 
of these points have to be highlighted at this place: first, although the right to strike 
might be a legitimate reason to restrict the four freedoms granted by the EC-Treaty, 
there are considerable limits to the exercise of this right that go beyond the 
restrictions present in the national systems of industrial relations beforehand. Even in 
the pluralist system which is very restrictive when it comes to industrial action, such 
case-law might have negative results for trade unions, as the complexity of such 
situations, where European law including the ECJ’s case-law has to be applied, 
easily casts doubts of illegality on the industrial action envisaged. If such doubts 
exist, courts are able to forbid industrial action. Second, in the context of European 
law member states have a big incentive to cooperate with their trade unions in 
situations of conflict, as they themselves might be held responsible after the state 
liability doctrine, if they do not take the necessary steps to avoid damages of those 
persons or companies invoking the four freedoms. Note that the state liability doctrine 
is not to be found within the Treaties, but has been developed by the ECJ. To sum 
up, the case-law of the ECJ might lead to a less influential role for the trade unions in 
all models of industrial relations, as taking industrial action is made more difficult. 
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Conclusions with regard to European integration 
 
Although it was not part of the research design of this master thesis, one might want 
to ask where the intentional or unintentional promotion of tripartite concertation may 
lead in terms of future European integration. By turning to liberal 
intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, the two dominant theoretical streams on 
European integration, we may find some hints, where future research might want to 
start from. 
 
If we first turn to the effects of soft modes, there is a broad consensus in the literature 
that procedures like the Open Method of Coordination have not met their potential. 
The problem with soft modes that also has been identified in this paper is their low 
output, while they nevertheless do not allow for common goal-setting in the national 
arena. The goals of soft modes are defined at the European level and usually not by 
the social partners. Therefore, trade unions do not have an incentive to participate in 
soft modes, as they - on one hand - cannot influence the goals pursued. On the other 
- they do not need to be afraid of major changes stemming from soft modes, as they 
have no influence on actual policy-making except for some singular examples 
(Mailand 2008). There is therefore no reason to believe that trade unions would shift 
their loyalties to the European level one day or another like neofunctionalism would 
suggest, or that their cost-benefit calculation would be more positive with more 
integration as liberal intergovernmentalism would require. Soft modes therefore do 
not promote integration – at least not with trade unions. 
 
Autonomous social partner agreements create a split within the labour movement: 
while trade unions in corporatist countries are afraid of loosing the status they 
achieved in their home country, trade unions in the pluralist and contestational model 
may gain influence and other benefits as their actual levels of involvement in the 
policy-making process lie beneath the level envisaged by the European system. The 
problem for integration, at least in liberal intergovernmentalism, would be situated at 
the other side of the employment relationship, as resistance should be expected from 
business in those two models, as higher standards of protection also mean higher 
costs. We end up in a situation where the actual outcome regarding the domestic 
attitude towards integration would have to be judged on a case-to-case base, 
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depending on how powers between business and labour, and other societal actors 
respectively, are distributed. While this uniformity of the state is a key determinant in 
intergovernmentalism, this would not be a problem to neofunctionalism, as here the 
actors which favour integration shift their expectations and loyalties towards the 
European level, ultimately increasing pressures on the domestic system with their 
actions taken. The problem with autonomous social partner agreements is that it is 
not clear how much the European level has actually contributed to the final results, 
as the participation of the domestic actors has been high. Dolvik called this 
“Zweckrationalität” (Dolvik 1997), as the European level associations are seen only 
as instruments to achieve the domestic results and due to their organizational 
structure do not enjoy leeway. Solutions to problems and unintended consequences 
could not easily be found at the European level, as the necessary European level 
compromise would be hard to achieve.  
 
When we now turn to harmonization of laws all over Europe by means of the 
Community method, at first glance the social partners in the contestational and the 
pluralist model should be in favour of integration, while those in the corporatist model 
should not, if the discussions in this paper regarding the transformation of the 
industrial relations systems hold true. But a more detailed analysis of the cost-
benefit-calculation of the social partners reveals that although they might become 
more powerful in the domestic arena, horizontal integration might decrease the fields 
in which such increased participation would be of benefit. Insofar, even those social 
partners in the pluralist and contestational model would not support the widening of 
European level competence, but should be willing to support deepening to a certain 
extent, if – like liberal intergovernmentalism suggests – the cost-benefit calculation is 
decisive. Regarding neofunctionalism, the decisive question would be if the social 
partners are able to correctly set up such a cost-benefit-calculation in order to get 
clear on their self-interest. If they agree that although they might win influence in 
some areas, they would lose influence in others due to competence delegation to the 
European level, the result would be the same as in liberal intergovernmentalism. 
What is sure, though, is that if they do not see clear benefits from integration, they 
will not regard integration as a qualified instrument for solving the problems they 
face. 
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The effect on integration of the last mode discussed, the decisions of the ECJ, is 
simply summarized: trade unions’ opposition towards Europe integration would be 
increased, and the one of business potentially as well. The restrictions trade unions 
suffer due to the case law directly influence their situation to the negative, as their 
main instrument of power, industrial action, is circumcised. In such a situation, 
neither liberal intergovernmentalism nor neofunctionalism would assume a positive 
effect on the attitude towards integration in any way. Business is in a complicated 
situation as well, as single companies may profit from the situation created by the 
ECJ, while associations have to fear negative effects like increased costs due to a 
more adversarial climate. This argument as well has a pro-integrationist element: 
single companies that are able to create a cross-border situation use the existing 
situation to pursue their own self-interest and therefore increase transactions 
between member states, ultimately leading to even more unintended consequences. 
Whether or not such a neofunctionalist prediction is likely depends on how many 
single companies are indeed able to pursue such a strategy. 
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Annex I: Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung der 
Diplomarbeit 
 
Die sozialpolitische Kompetenz der Europäischen Union hat seit deren Gründung 
stetig zugenommen. Auch wenn die europäischen Sozialsysteme nach wie vor zum 
überwiegenden Teil in der Gestaltungsmacht der einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten liegen, 
so liegt dennoch ein beachtlicher Einfluss der europäischen Ebene auch auf dieses 
Politikfeld vor. Gleichzeitig wird die Sozialpolitik in den Mitgliedsstaaten in 
unterschiedlichem Ausmaß von den Interessensvertretungen der ArbeitnehmerInnen 
und der ArbeitgeberInnen, also den Sozialpartnern, beeinflusst und mitgestaltet. 
Dennoch existieren nur wenige Versuche, die langfristigen Auswirkungen von 
Integrationsprozessen auf die jeweiligen Systeme der Arbeitsbeziehungen 
wissenschaftlich zu betrachten. 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, welche Auswirkungen die 
europäische Integration auf die Möglichkeiten nationaler 
ArbeitnehmerInnenvertretungen haben könnte. Im Vordergrund steht dabei nicht eine 
empirische Untersuchung der tatsächlichen Auswirkungen, sondern eine Diskussion 
des durch verschiedene europäische Instrumente erzeugten Anpassungsdrucks auf 
nationale Systeme der Arbeitsbeziehungen. Erst durch das Vorliegen eines 
entsprechenden Anpassungsdrucks werden Transformationsprozesse in den 
jeweiligen nationalen Systemen angeregt. Es handelt sich bei den schlussendlichen 
Ergebnissen der vorliegenden Arbeit daher um Rückwirkungen von bereits 
abgeschlossenen Integrationsprozessen auf die nationale Ebene und daher um 
Europäisierungsprozesse. 
 
Um die angesprochenen Phänomene näher fassen zu können, bedient sich die 
vorliegende Arbeit folgender Konzeption: Durch die Tätigkeiten der Europäischen 
Union entsteht in den Mitgliedsstaaten ein Handlungsbedarf, der je nach gewähltem 
Instrument unterschiedlich stark ausfallen kann. Grundsätzlich lassen sich vier 
solcher Instrumente unterscheiden: Erstens, ‚soft-modes of governance‘ - wie etwa 
die Offene Methode der Koordinierung – deren Charakteristikum in ihrer rechtlichen 
Unverbindlichkeit liegt. Zweitens, der Europäische Soziale Dialog, wie er in den Art 
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137 bis 139 des EG-Vertrags (i.d.F.d. Vertrags von Nizza) vorgesehen ist und der 
durch die Zusammenarbeit der europäischen ArbeitnehmerInnen- und 
ArbeitgeberInnenorganisationen gekennzeichnet ist. Drittens, die klassische 
Gemeinschaftsmethode, die rechtlich bindende Bestimmungen zum Ergebnis hat. 
Viertens, Judikatur des Europäischen Gerichtshofs. 
 
Die Anforderungen der europäischen Ebene, die in Form der genannten vier 
Instrumente artikuliert werden, treffen in den Mitgliedsstaaten auf unterschiedlich 
ausgeformte Systeme der Arbeitsbeziehungen. Diese Systeme lassen sich entweder 
als konfliktisch, pluralistisch oder korporatistisch beschreiben. Trotz der Unterschiede 
in diesen Systemen müssten europäische Vorgaben in all diesen Systemen zu 
vergleichbarem Anpassungsdruck führen, da ansonsten andere Faktoren als die 
europäischen Inputs für allfällige Transformationsprozesse ausschlaggebend wären.  
Die Kombination der verschiedenen Systeme der Arbeitsbeziehungen mit den der 
europäischen Ebene zur Verfügung stehenden Instrumenten ergibt folgendes Bild: 
In Hinblick auf soft modes of governance ist kein nachhaltiger Anpassungsdruck zu 
erwarten. Dies liegt daran, dass in konfliktischen und im pluralistischen System die 
Beteiligung der Gewerkschaften am politischen Prozess zwar zumeist schwächer 
ausgeprägt ist, als dies durch die in den soft modes enthaltenen Vorgaben gedacht 
ist und somit eine Stärkung des Einflusses der Gewerkschaften stattfindet. Jedoch 
hat sich herausgestellt, dass soft modes wie die Offene Methode der Koordinierung 
keine langfristigen Resultate ergeben. Dadurch verschwindet ein allfällig 
vorhandener Anreiz in Richtung tripartistischer Konzertierung. Außerdem enthalten 
soft modes das Problem, dass die Zieldefinition des Prozesses den nationalen 
AkteurInnen nicht zugänglich ist und somit auch nicht deren Konsens widerspiegelt.  
 
Das zweite Instrument ist der Europäische Soziale Dialog. Dabei sind zwei 
unterschiedliche Erscheinungsformen auseinanderzuhalten: jene, bei der die 
Einigung der Sozialpartner durch einen Beschluss des Rates rechtsverbindlich wird 
und jene, bei der diese Einigung autonom durch die nationalen Mitgliedsverbände 
umgesetzt wird. Da Erstere näher an der Gemeinschaftsmethode liegt, wurde sie in 
deren Kontext behandelt. Bei der Zweiteren zeigt sich, dass Anpassungsdruck in 
Richtung tripartistischer Konzertierung gegeben ist. Während sowohl die 
ArbeitnehmerInnen- als auch die ArbeitgeberInnenseite in konfliktischen und 
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pluralistischen Systemen deutlich an Gestaltungsspielraum gewinnen können, gilt 
dies genauso für den Staat. Dieser kann einerseits die europäischen Vorgaben zur 
Einbindung der relevanten Zivilgesellschaft erfüllen als auch Kosten in 
Zusammenhang mit nationalen Umsetzungsprozessen sparen. In korporatistischen 
Systemen ist hingegen der gegenteilige Effekt zu beobachten, da die Sozialpartner 
Mechanismen abgeneigt sind, die hinter ihrem bisherigen Einfluss zurückbleiben 
könnten. Durch Nicht-Beteiligung könnten jedoch Dezentralisierungsprozesse 
ausgelöst werden, die zur Schwächung des korporatistischen Systems führen. 
 
Das dritte europäische Instrument besteht in der Gemeinschaftsmethode. Hier 
deuten die Diskussionen in der vorliegenden Diplomarbeit darauf hin, dass wenig 
Unterschiede zwischen informellem und formellem Zwang bestehen. Selbst wenn 
Ergebnisse der Gemeinschaftsmethode mit juristischer Hilfe durchsetzbar sind, so 
erzeugen sie dennoch den gleichen Anpassungsdruck wie nicht formell 
durchsetzbare Sozialpartnerabkommen. 
 
Die vierte und letzte Variante stellt die Judikatur des EuGH dar. Durch die universelle 
Anwendbarkeit der hinter den konkreten Urteilen stehenden Erwägungen stellt diese 
Form das schärfste Instrument dar. Nationale Partikularitäten können nur in 
geringem Maße (im Rahmen der Rechtfertigungsgründe) berücksichtigt werden. So 
hat sich etwa in der Judikatur des EuGH zum Streikrecht gezeigt, dass diese großen 
Anpassungsdruck insbesondere auf die korporatistischen Systeme erzeugt. 
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Integrationsforschung der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 
 3/2008 bis 10/2008: Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter des Abg.z.NR Christian 
Hursky 
 10/2006 bis 2/2008: Öffentlichkeitsreferent der Bundesvertretung der 
Österreichischen HochschülerInnenschaft  
 3/2007 bis 11/2007: Zivildienst 
 
Zusätzliche Qualifikationen: 
 Englisch: fließend 
 Französisch: gute Kenntnisse in Wort und Schrift 
 Niederländisch: Muttersprache 
